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With the pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 raging around the 
world, many countries’ economies are at a crucial juncture. The COVID-19 external shock 
to the economy has the potential to affect corporate governance profoundly. This Article 
explores its possible impact on comparative corporate governance. For an economy to 
operate successfully, a society must first find a politically sustainable social equilibrium. 
In many countries, historical crises—such as the Great Depression and World War II—
have resulted in a reconfiguration of corporate governance institutions that set the course 
for generations. While it is not yet clear whether COVID-19 will have a similar effect, it is 
possible that it will change patterns of what kind of firms are—from an evolutionary per-
spective—likely to survive, and which ones are not. We argue that to some extent, it will 
accelerate ongoing trends, whereas in other areas it put corporations on an entirely new 
course. We observe three trends, namely the need for resilience, a growth of nationalist 
policies in corporate law, and an increasing orientation toward “stakeholder” interests. 
First, firms will have to become resilient to the crisis and consequently long-term oriented. 
Corporations that are not operating merely on an arm’s length capital market basis but 
are integrated into a network, generated by core shareholders, state ownership, or bank 
lending may be more likely to survive. In addition, firms are beginning to interact with 
their workforce differently in their attempts to maintain what could be called “healthy hu-
man capital.” Second, we are likely to see a resurgence of nationalism in corporate gov-
ernance to ensure that foreign ownership and interconnected supply chains do not put na-
tional security at risk. Third, the existing critiques of inequality but also climate change 
awareness will accelerate the trend toward a broadening of corporate purpose toward 
“stakeholderism” and public policy issues. As in the past years, institutional investors act-
ing as “universal owners” will play a role in shaping this trend. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 emerged in Wuhan, China, in December 
2019, some epidemiology experts were alarmed, but the general public in much of the 
world, let alone business leadership, did not take notice or was not particularly concerned. 
A year into the outbreak of the pandemic, almost two million individuals have died, the 
disease has affected close to a hundred million people,
1
 and it has touched the lives of all 
of us. Around the world, countries have taken harsh measures to combat the disease, in-
cluding lockdowns that have caused huge disruptions to work, life, and the economy. 
Not surprisingly, corporate governance is at a critical juncture as well. As the COVID-
19 pandemic rages around the globe, firms have struggled to survive lockdowns with se-
vere effects on the economy. Restrictions have caused GDP drops and increased unem-
ployment to levels worse than that of the Great Depression.
2
 While an end to COVID-19 
 
 1.  For recent data, see Coronavirus Cases, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/LG5J-ATYL]. 
 2.  See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., The Lancet COVID-19 Commission, 396 LANCET 454, 455 (2020) 
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is in sight with vaccinations and medical innovations, it remains unclear how long the pan-
demic will last and how severe its economic effects will ultimately be. This Article argues 
that COVID-19 will have a lasting effect on corporate governance around the world. We 
suggest that large corporations will be run and controlled differently, and the interaction 
between firms and their shareholders and other stakeholders will change as a result of the 
pandemic. The balance between the interest groups dominating corporate governance in-
ternationally may change. 
The pandemic will not necessarily entail a clean break—i.e., there will not be a post-
COVID corporate governance that is sharply distinct from its antecedent. The financial 
crisis of 2008–09 has already set some trends in motion that will accelerate because of the 
shock brought about by the novel coronavirus.
3
 On this point, the pandemic is not unprec-
edented. While corporate governance tends to evolve gradually during times of peace, pros-
perity, and growth, historical examples show that it takes leaps during periods of severe 
social and economic disruptions. Specifically, the structures that characterized corporate 
governance in the second half of the 20th century emerged as a result of the disruptions 
during its first half, most of all the Great Depression and World War II, in some of the 
major wealthy jurisdictions.
4
 Consequently, the United States and the United Kingdom 
developed dispersed ownership structures and deep capital markets, while other developed 
economies, in particular Continental European jurisdictions such as Germany, had concen-
trated ownership and lacked similarly developed stock markets.
5
 Japan, another country 




While the second half of the 20th century certainly did not eschew economic disrup-
tions, overall the economy resembled a ship sailing through comparatively calm waters. 
Especially during the later decades, corporate governance in many countries seemed on the 
way toward what traditional corporate governance scholars would consider efficient struc-
tures. Starting in the United States and the United Kingdom, the law and markets began to 
be increasingly oriented toward the interests of outside investors. During the 1990s and 
2000s, many countries in Europe and Asia began to move increasingly toward this “share-
holder model,” resulting in a debate about convergence in corporate governance.
7
 With the 
2008–09 financial crisis, fissures in this model began to emerge. 
We argue that the COVID-19 pandemic, as an exogenous shock with the potential to 
change many aspects of the economy, will push corporate governance further away from 
shareholder orientation by turning around a number of trends and accelerating other shifts 
that have already begun during the past ten years. We suggest that change will occur 
 
(providing information on the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
 3.  Infra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
 4.  E.g., ALAN J. DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE xv, 
xviii, 15, 96, 208, 254, 395 (2009) (arguing that amending corporate governance systems does not create the 
certainty that people often desire). 
 5.  E.g., Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 167, 167 (1998) (explaining Germany’s lack of good securities markets). 
 6.  E.g., Julian Franks et al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century, 27 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2580, 2581 (2014) (describing the transformation of Japanese corporate governance after World War II). 
 7.  Infra notes 120–130 and accompanying text. 
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broadly in three areas—a turn from “efficient” to “resilient” corporate governance struc-
tures, the return to nationalism in corporate law and governance, and a strengthening of an 
existing tendency toward what can be called “stakeholderism.”
8
 
First, we argue that firms will abandon certain practices that are usually considered 
efficient in favor of resiliency. Over the past decades, companies have developed cross-
border supply chain networks and just-in-time logistics,
9
 which are difficult to maintain as 
countries re-erect economic barriers. Similarly, on the financial side, companies have 
slimmed down and reduced corporate “fat” by taking on debt and returning excess cash to 
shareholders in the form of dividends and share repurchases.
10
 All of these practices tend 
to be beneficial in an economically stable environment characterized by growth, but they 
are detrimental when firms need to weather a storm. 
In addition, during the debate about convergence in corporate governance analysts 
have extolled companies with dispersed ownership that are consequently most attentive to 
the interests of outside investors.
11
 At least, this is the general picture we have of firms in 
the “Anglo-Saxon” systems of the United States and the United Kingdom.
12
 Supported by 
tentative early evidence, we suggest that firms that are part of a larger network are more 
likely to survive hard times. Such a network could be integrated into a corporate group, 
concentrated ownership, or close links to the government. 
Finally, we argue that resiliency will increasingly require firms to ensure they work 
toward developing a healthy workforce. Thus, traditional human capital theories of the 
capital-labor interaction will have to be supplemented by “healthy human capital.” In part, 
this means that firms will have incentives to hire staff that does not fall into a risk group, 
which raises the specter of discrimination.
13
 However, it also means that firms will need to 
develop practices that avoid contagion with their long-term workforce to the extent that it 
still needs to interact physically. The degree of physical interaction depends on the nature 
of the job. The increasing digitalization of the workforce, which has been accelerated by 
the pandemic, may influence the relative bargaining power of capital and labor. The spe-
cific new balance will depend largely on the degree of digitalization of the employee’s job, 
and on the specificity of their human capital. Digitalization may also make human capital 
less firm-specific because employers may be able to draw on a larger recruiting pool. 
 
 8.  The term refers to the idea that large companies should not only serve the interests of shareholders, but 
their other “stakeholders” as well. E.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, ‘Stakeholder’ Capitalism Seems 
Mostly for Show, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2020, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-
seems-mostly-for-show-11596755220 [https://perma.cc/ZQB8-MRAK]. 
 9.  Hing Kai Chan et al., Implementing Just-in-Time Philosophy to Reverse Logistics Systems: A Review, 
48 INT’L J. PROD. RSCH. 6293, 6295–96 (2010); Richard Baldwin & Javier Lopez-Gonzalez, Supply-Chain Trade: 
A Portrait of Global Patterns and Several Testable Hypotheses, 38 WORLD ECON. 1682, 1682 (2015). 
 10.  Infra notes 148–167 and accompanying text. 
 11.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443 
(2001). 
 12.  Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491–98 (1999). 
 13.  Reinhardt Stefan Tomek et al., Salzburg Declaration, Outcome of the Conference on “System Change?! 
The Chance of Transformation of the Healthcare Sector: Analysis and Chance Within the Coronavirus Crisis”, 
(Sept. 2020), https://europepmc.org/article/ppr/ppr242581 [https://perma.cc/2RPH-LZMN] [hereinafter Salzburg 
Declaration]. 
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Second, we propose that we will see a greater significance of nationalism and/or pro-
tectionism in corporate law. During the past decades, government ownership of parts of the 
economy has generally had a bad name because of its perceived inefficiencies.
14
 And yet, 
we are already seeing its limited resurgence in key companies that are being bailed out. A 
major element of this is an increasing concern that countries want to avoid becoming de-
pendent on international investors with political motives, such as firms affiliated with the 
People’s Republic of China.
15
 Western countries are increasingly concerned about the dis-
tribution of valuable goods and resources, such as medication, being put at risk by politi-
cally tainted supply chains. The United States and the EU have therefore already strength-
ened their foreign direct investment (FDI) rules.
16
 However, government ownership is only 
the strongest version of corporate nationalism. More limited aspects include “Golden 
Shares,” where public actors reserve the right to veto certain decisions,
17
 and the ability 
for firms to defend against (foreign) takeovers.
18
 We are likely to see a movement away 
from limitations of these two. Finally, particularly in Europe, we will likely see pressure 
on certain elements of EU law intended to create a level playing field in the internal market, 
such as state aid law—which restricts subsidies—and public procurement law.
19
 
Third, we are likely to experience a return of “stakeholderism” in corporate govern-
ance. Stakeholders are “constituencies” of the firm besides shareholders to whose interests 
a corporation is expected to give regard.
20
 In addition to concerns of labor, we identify an 
increasing concern for two public policy issues. First, the pandemic and the economic fall-
out of the lockdowns have exacerbated economic inequality in many jurisdictions. An in-
creasing number of industries are being disrupted by digitalization, rendering some past 
human capital investment useless. Furloughed and laid-off workers are losing their liveli-
hood and will have to dip into their savings. A number of proposals to address this issue 
have been brought forward in corporate governance, including employee participation on 
the board, which—after decades of criticism—seems to be gaining ground in Europe 
again.
21
 In addition, the Business Roundtable’s 2019 statement on corporate purpose has 
abandoned shareholder wealth maximization for a stakeholder conception of the corpora-
tion.
22
 This is not a movement unique to the United States, but we are seeing parallels in 
other jurisdictions. Second, climate change has not entirely disappeared from the public 
eye and is likely to come back as a more intense discussion during the coming years. Inter-
estingly, on both issues we are seeing an increased pressure from the financial industry for 
 
 14.  Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2958 
(2012). 
 15.  Jeffrey N. Gordon & Curtis J. Milhaupt, China as a “National Strategic Buyer”: Toward a Multilateral 
Regime for Cross-Border M&A, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 192, 212–13 (2019). 
 16.  Infra notes 268–274 and accompanying text. 
 17.  Infra notes 290–292 and accompanying text. 
 18.  Infra notes 296–309 and accompanying text. 
 19.  Infra notes 318–325 and accompanying text. 
 20.  Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 8. 
 21.  Infra notes 132–36, 345–49 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://s3.amazo-
naws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationOctober2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KXW-
JE7K]. 
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corporations to adjust and address them on the company level. Moreover, since govern-
ments in many countries have become more involved in the economy with COVID-19, it 
is possible that it will use these “war powers”
23
 to address other pressing concerns. 
Overall, these consequences allow us to draw larger lessons for (comparative) corpo-
rate governance. We may see a reconfiguring of institutions in many jurisdictions. Corpo-
rate governance has often been analogized to biological evolution. While the shock of the 
pandemic had an immediate effect on many firms, it is likely to change the larger economic 
environment for years to come as lockdowns and smaller shocks come and go. Thus, we 
are likely to see persistent effects. 
In biology, evolutionary processes do not always happen gradually, but we sometimes 
see (apparent) leaps in the fossil record, which has inspired the evolutionary theory of 
punctuated equilibrium.
24
 The law, which evolves memetically rather than genetically,
25
 
is even more amenable to leaps. Suddenly firms (and countries) operate in a very different 
economic ecosystem that may force rapid adjustment. While corporate law evolved grad-
ually since World War II in most Western jurisdictions, COVID-19 may trigger leaps 
around the world that set the corporate governance trajectory for the long run. In particular, 
the pro-shareholder trends of the past decades will likely be eroded in favor of other struc-
tures that are more likely to survive difficult times. 
The other lesson is that corporate law is contingent on the larger social and economic 
environment. As Mark Roe wrote in 2003, “[b]efore a nation can produce, it must achieve 
social peace.”
26
 While Roe was referring to the structures emerging in Europe and Japan 
after World War II as a result of political turmoil, the socio-economic fallout of the pan-
demic may result in new corporate structures that may not necessarily be efficient in the 
sense of creating a global optimum. In the context of the current crisis, they will likely help 
to address social issues, thus paving a hopeful way for long-term development. Corporate 
governance, however, will not remain as it used to be. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II surveys the economic impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic. Part III summarizes comparative corporate governance developments since 
the middle of the 20th century, arguing that critical historical junctures set the scene for 
corporate governance until today. Part IV—the core of this paper—looks at three likely 
effects of the current crisis. First, we argue that corporations will have to develop more 
resilient (as opposed to traditionally “efficient”) structures to thrive. Second, we argue that 
nationalism is already returning to corporate governance, thus resulting in more closed 
markets. Third, corporate law will move away from a shareholder primacy position and 
embrace stakeholder and public policy concerns to a greater degree. Finally, Part V ex-
plores how COVID-19 may affect the political economy, evolutionary dynamics, and in-
ternational convergence in corporate governance. Part VI summarizes and concludes. 
 
 23.  Infra notes 416–420 and accompanying text.  
 24.  Niles Eldredge & S. J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, in 
MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82, 83–84 (Thomas J.M. Schopf ed., 1972). 
 25.  Regarding memetic evolution, see RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE: 40TH ANNIVERSARY 
EDITION 245 (2016). 
 26.  MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2003). 
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II. COVID-19 AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT 
A. COVID-19 
The new Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) causes an infectious disease that was first diag-
nosed in Wuhan, China, in December 2019.
27
 The majority of those infected with COVID-
19 only develop mild symptoms such as fever, cough, difficulty breathing, and tiredness, 
as well as loss of smell and taste, rashes, and other diffuse symptoms.
28
 Depending on age 
and prevalence, COVID-19 can also lead to acute complications such as organ failure, cy-
tokine loads, blood clots, and septic shock.
29
 Pre-existing conditions, such as obesity and 
diabetes, as well as the general status of the immune system, are crucial determinants as to 
whether the new coronavirus is of severe danger to the individual.
30
 Prevention and holistic 




In January 2020, the World Health Organization declared a state of emergency with 
international relevance over COVID-19, and in March 2020 the outbreak of a global pan-
demic.
32
 As of the beginning of 2021, almost 90 million infected cases are known and 
almost two million deaths have been recorded in over 215 countries in all six World Health 
Organization territories.
33
 Exponentially growing numbers of infections, the lack of a com-
plete cure so far, and recurrent infection patterns project that there may not be a fast end to 
the crisis in the near future.
34
 With the emergency authorization of a number of apparently 
effective medicines in late 2020 and early 2021, a mitigation of the healthcare crisis may 
finally be within reach, while the economic long-term impact and the corporate governance 
legacy are yet to be determined. 
B. Economic Losses Resulting from COVID-19 
In the decade prior to COVID, globalization slowed. From 2010 on, a trend called 
“slowbalization” depicted stagnant or declining international trade, finance, and profits 
abroad.
35
 As the internet online window to the world shed light on production conditions 
abroad, in many developed jurisdictions firms felt increasingly compelled by political pres-
sure to re-shore production and localize global value chains.
36
 Contagion risks became 
 
 27.  Timeline: WHO’s COVID-19 Response, WHO, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coro-
navirus-2019/interactive-timeline [https://perma.cc/967K-V5UJ]. 
 28.  Symptoms of Coronavirus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 22, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html [https://perma.cc/YJM7-2EQD]. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Salzburg Declaration, supra note 13. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Timeline: WHO’s COVID-19 Response, supra note 27.  
 33.  Sachs et al., supra note 2, at 454; Coronavirus Cases, supra note 1. 
 34.  UN Response to COVID-19, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus/UN-response 
[https://perma.cc/ST7P-X424].  
 35.  The Steam Has Gone out of Globalisation, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.econo-
mist.com/leaders/2019/01/24/the-steam-has-gone-out-of-globalisation [https://perma.cc/9LBA-4PGV]. 
 36.  Multinational Companies Are Adjusting to Shorter Supply Chains, ECONOMIST (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/07/11/multinational-companies-are-adjusting-to-shorter-sup-
ply-chains [https://perma.cc/U3R7-N3T5]. 
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apparent as shadows of the invisible hand—as vividly outlined in the 2008–09 world fi-
nancial recession financial spill-overs, food insecurity emerging out of commodity prices’ 
international interdependence and global health safety risks in spreading diseases in an 
increasingly mobile general population.
37
 Since 2016, nationalism emerged in homeland-
first and EU-exit sentiments.
38
 The ongoing coronavirus-crisis exacerbated these trends of 
slowing globalization by putting an abrupt halt to global mobility and migration.
39
 
The COVID-19 crisis represents the most unforeseen external shock for modern hu-
mankind, which has further slowed globalization. Starting from the beginning of 2020, the 
novel coronavirus caused a dramatic downturn for general mobility and international tour-
ism including gastronomy.
40
 In April 2020, more than half the world’s population resided 
in countries enforcing lockdowns, which disrupted individual lives, business activities, and 
international mobility.
41
 These lockdowns led to a slump in general consumption and re-
duced trade by an estimated 10%.
42
 In the first half of 2020, global foreign direct invest-
ments were down 49%, even around 75% suppressed in the developed world.
43
 The global 
economy is estimated to have contracted by 4.3% in 2020, which is six times the economic 
magnitude of the 2008–09 world recession.
44
 Overall, the suppression of human social in-
teraction in all major world economies spilled over into an economic decline around the 
globe comparable to the onset of the Great Depression.
45
 Current forecasts suggest that the 
COVID-19 global recession will be the deepest since World War II, with the largest frac-
tion of economies experiencing declines in per capita output since 1870.
46
 
But what differed from previous financial turmoil and economic crises was the fact 
 
 37.  Miguel Angel Centeno et al., Global Systemic Risk: Proposal for a Research Community (Apr. 1, 2013) 
(Princeton Inst. Int’l and Reg’l Stud. Working Paper, 2013) (on file with authors). 
 38.  Sofia Profita, Slowbalization and Its Risks (2019) (Columbia Univ. Working Paper) (on file with au-
thors). 
 39.  Julia Margarete Puaschunder, Artificial Intelligence Market Disruption, RSCH. ASS’N INTERDISC. 
STUD. CONF. PROC.: 13TH INT’L RAIS CONF. ON SOC. SCI. & HUMANS. 1 (June 2019), http://rais.education/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/01-JP.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHD2-DZMG]. 
 40.  Julia Margarete Puaschunder et al., COVID-19 Shock: Socio-Technical, Legal, Corporate, Economic 
and Governance Changes, RSCH. ASS’N INTERDISC. STUD. CONF. PROC.: 18TH INT’L RSCH. ASS’N INTERDISC. 
STUD. CONF. ON SOC. SCI. & HUMANITIES 5 (Aug. 22, 2020); see generally Stefan Gössling et al., Pandemics, 
Tourism and Global Change: A Rapid Assessment of COVID-19, 29 J. SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 2 (2020). 
 41.  Policy Responses to COVID-19, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-
covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 [https://perma.cc/M9NK-YKQJ].  
 42.  Changing Places, ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.economist.com/special-re-
port/2020/10/08/changing-places [https://perma.cc/2AEQ-3SWK]. 
 43.  Investment Trends Monitor, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. 1 (Oct. 2020), 
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeiainf2020d4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/448D-X5YE]. 
 44.  GLOBAL OUTLOOK, WORLD BANK 3 (Jan. 2021), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/han-
dle/10986/34710/9781464816123-Ch01.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY4E-4W3N]. 
 45.  Sachs et al., supra note 2, at 455; see also How COVID-19 Is Changing the World: A Statistical Per-
spective, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. COMM. FOR COORDINATION OF STAT. ACTIVITIES 14–31 
(2020), https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7LQ-NFSR] 
(demonstrating the economic decline in various industries). 
 46.  Ayhan Kose & Naotaka Sugawara, Understanding the Depth of the 2020 Global Recession in 5 Charts, 
WORLD BANK (June 15, 2020), https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/understanding-depth-2020-global-reces-
sion-5-charts [https://perma.cc/JH6L-G6XS]. 
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that the economic fallout was not caused by financial constraints and economic fundamen-
tals, but came out of an external shock that caused “social volatility”—the collective mood 
about a pandemic hitting humankind.
47
 What also differed was the fact that there was un-
precedentedly clear inequality in individual preconditions and work parameters shaping 
the outcome in meeting the crisis that divided the market in winning and losing individuals, 
industries, and nations.
48
 To this day, the crisis appears to widen the gap between financial 
market performance and real economy liquidity constraints. 
As for the economic fallout in the wake of “social distancing” measures, consumption 
decreased by 46% in China, 97% in Germany, and 20% in the United States, as well as 
78% in Great Britain.
49
 The Financial Times Stock Exchange Group, Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, and Nikkei plummeted in the first quarter of 2020 drastically.
50
 Unemployment 
increased up to 70% in the mid-career segment.
51
 Forty million European workers were 
sent on short-time work.
52
 For example, unemployment rose in Germany from 3.2% to 
only 3.9% thanks to widespread Kurzarbeit labor protection plans, which encouraged firms 
to reduce work hours instead of laying off or furloughing workers.
53
 In more market-ori-
ented territories, the impact was more severe.
54
 For example, in Great Britain unemploy-
ment jumped from 3.8% to 5.4%, and in the United States from 3.7% to 8.9%.
55
 According 
to the OECD and Bloomberg, 19% of workers were furloughed in Great Britain, 23% in 
Germany and 41% in France.
56




 47.  SIANNE NGAI, THEORY OF THE GIMMICK: AESTHETIC JUDGMENT AND CAPITALIST FORM 170 (2020); 
A Crisis Like No Other, an Uncertain Recovery, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020 [https://perma.cc/ZTV8-
87CH]; Benjamin Lee, Volatility, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL FINANCE STUDIES 46, 54–68 (Chris-
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poverty levels put an additional 150 million children at risk worldwide.
58
 The 2021 global 
growth is projected at 5.2%, which leaves the 2021 GDP some 6.5 percentage points lower 
than in the pre-COVID-19 projections of January 2020.
59
 A shock seems to end globaliza-
tion and international exchange if considering the World Bank expecting the sharpest de-
cline in remittances in recent world history.
60
 All these measures resemble the onset of a 
lasting crisis
61
 with potential for fundamental system reset,
62
 which—together with subse-




C. Economic Shifts in the Wake of COVID-19 
At the same time, COVID-19 has also perpetuated the online tech world. Physically 
distant, we came closer digitally than ever before. Worldwide data traffic exploded on a 
flat digital globe. Contrary to the counter-globalization trends of the past, one area that 
grew globally and exponentially since 2010 is digitalized data transfer.
64
 In the decade 
prior to COVID-19, an already ongoing digitalization disruption heralded as “big data” 
allowed a set of innovative firms, including social media, online commercial platforms, 
and search engines to reap skyrocketing profits that often remain untaxed.
65
 These eco-
nomic gains are concentrated in areas such as big data hoarding, the sale of behavioral data 
about consumers, and targeting online audiences with customized advertisement.
66
 
In contrast to earlier system-inherent economic turmoil resulting in financial sector 
induced liquidity constraints, the external COVID shock caused “social volatility”—a col-
lectively depressed mood that largely dampened consumption. The difference to previous 
systemic recessions can be seen in the rapid recovery of well-managed financial funds—
for example, the S&P 500 recovered 50% of its pre-COVID value within the first three 
months after the crisis and reached an all-time high in August 2020. Deutsche Bank rec-
orded rising earnings during the ongoing coronavirus crisis, with its investment bank 
branch leading with 43% or 2.4 billion euros revenue.
67
 The clear distinction between 
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COVID-19 profit and loss industries made it possible for today’s highly flexible financial 
world to exchange underperforming market segments—such as oil, public transport, and 
aviation, face-to-face service sectors such as international hospitality and gastronomy—
with outperforming market options—such as pharmaceuticals and emergency devices for 
healthcare, digital technologies, fintech, artificial intelligence, and big data analytics in-
dustries, online retail, automotive and interior design and architecture. 
COVID-19 now not only created significant health and security risks, social discrim-
ination, and economic costs, but also brought about unanticipated opportunities. Industries 
profiting economically from the pandemic are comprised of hygiene, pharmaceuticals, and 
the medical professions.
68
 From an economic perspective, COVID-19 is an external shock 
that has accelerated ongoing digitalization trends.
69
 Because of widespread lockdowns, 
“social distancing” and increased home office work in many industries, social scientists 
have observed a more widespread acceptance for instant communication tools, social en-
gagement, and entertainment platforms.
70
 We can thus say that certain firms and industries 
have benefited from the pandemic while many others have suffered from the expenses and 
burdens of COVID-19.
71




Most of these trends are likely to continue in post-COVID economies, where hygiene 
and healthcare will further advance as healthier workers around the world will have a com-
petitive advantage.
73
 The overall health status of employers will become a precious asset 
for determining the individual prevalence for a mild or severe COVID disease trajectory. 
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For another, the individual health conscientiousness will influence the likelihood of be-
coming a “superspreader” at work. Employees that already had the novel coronavirus may 
have acquired some degree of immunity and may be in a more advantageous position to 
perform unhindered in the workspace, as will those who have been vaccinated. Elderly and 
chronically ill patients’ passing, and vulnerabilities risks already now change labor market 
demand towards favoring young, healthier and corona-survivors, who may benefit from a 
natural immunity and being more virus-resistant.
74
 
Employers may be more interested in what category their workforce may fall to plan 
workplace safety precaution measures when building healthy working conditions.
75
 More 
than ever before in the history of modern workforce do employers nowadays care about 
the overall well-being and physical interaction of their labor cadre in a hygienic environ-
ment. Respective preventive medical care of the workforce and community-building 
around monitoring of one’s own and others’ health but also group learning how to enhance 




In light of social distancing mandates and with the growth of scientific evidence de-
rived from algorithms and big data, workers with better access to internet connectivity and 
AI-human-compatibility (i.e., computer and AI literacy, and related skills) have growing 
competitive advantages.
77
 It may also become a matter of survival for large organizations 
to understand the health of their workers with the help of these novel technologies. On the 
one hand, employers will need to estimate whether workplace conditions are likely to pro-
duce mass outbreaks—such as the ones that, for instance, occurred in the meatpacking 
industry or luxury tourism cruise ships in several countries.
78
 On the other hand, and maybe 
less benignly, employers will want to know whether workers’ medical histories, genetic 
profiles, living arrangements and social habits are likely to result in COVID-19 infection 
risks and predict trajectory likelihoods based on genetic prevalence derived from big data 
analyses. With the entry of AI algorithms and insights derived from large data sets in the 
medical field,
79
 they may hope to maintain a healthy workforce through encouraging work-
ers’ self-monitoring, while also pro-actively caring for safety through mobile tracking of 
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infected as a means of crowd control, as well as potentially through the use of predictive 
algorithms. Much like many employers require drug tests at the hiring stage or periodically, 
they may seek to use digitalization tools to predict health statuses and working conditions’ 
outcomes to reduce the risk of being put out of business or severely harmed by a COVID-
19 outbreak. 
Arguably, firms that are better able to use technology to determine and track employ-
ees’ health status will be the winners in the post-pandemic market. It may be too early to 
say whether nimble startups and other small- and medium-sized firms will be more likely 
to succeed, or whether large corporate behemoths with access to large datasets will be more 
likely to thrive. Already, however, it is becoming apparent that these novel digitalization 
opportunities come with the price of a heightened responsibility to protect privacy in re-
trieving big data inference, ensure access to information and healthcare democratically, 
secure individuals from discrimination against health status propensities, and back those 
who are naturally hindered to compete in markets financially and socially.
80
 
III. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CRISIS AS A DETERMINANT AND 
ACCELERATOR OF LONG-TERM TRENDS 
As we have seen, certain industries suffered from the economic lockdown because 
their products or services could not be effectively sold or offered during the lockdown, for 
example, the hospitality, tourism, and retail industries, and many parts of the service sec-
tor.
81
 Others benefited greatly from increased demand under the given circumstances, such 
as hygiene product providers, social online media platforms, and online retailers.
82
 These 
effects will continue as the pandemic persists and will reshape economic structures in the 
years to come, with some industries ceasing to exist or shrinking in size, and others ex-
panding. 
However, from the perspective of corporate governance, two other questions loom. 
First, is COVID-19 likely to alter which types of corporate governance structures are con-
ducive to a firm’s survival and success? In other words, given that any corporate govern-
ance choice involves different costs and benefits, will the tradeoffs firms have to make in 
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corporate governance change? This question is not only significant in a descriptive manner, 
but also because it may help derive recommendations for firms on how to adjust. 
Second, are we likely to see long-term changes in country-level corporate governance 
structures? Again, any laws or regulations concerning corporate governance inevitably in-
volve tradeoffs. COVID-19 may change which laws are desirable. In order to enable firms 
to succeed, both domestically and in international competition, new legal frameworks may 
be better suited in light of new economic, social, and political circumstances. Thus, to 
compete internationally,
83
 but also to address new political challenges, countries may move 
to different corporate governance laws and arrangements. This may also mean that political 
bargains between different interest groups may come out differently as a new outcome in 
the perennial struggle over the changing rents produced by a country’s economy. 
Idiosyncratic historical events often had a lasting impact on the institutional choices 
of a country, with the impact felt over decades. The major industrialized countries emerged 
from the turmoil of the first half of the 20th century with very different corporate govern-
ance regimes. The United States was already dominated by the “Berle-Means corporation” 
before the Great Depression.
84
 New-Deal era economic legislation helped to further en-
trench the structure in place at the time, in part by maintaining a financial industry charac-
terized by comparatively small, local banks that were ill-positioned, compared to other 
jurisdictions, to develop into significant large shareholders.
85
 The 1933 Securities Act and 
1934 Securities Exchange Acts sought to protect outside investors through disclosure, 
which helped U.S. corporate governance to retain a basic pro-shareholder orientation, even 
some disclosure requirements inhibited coordination by institutional investors.
86
 
Thus, firms kept dispersed ownership structures dominated by powerful management 
and weak owners, in part because a large percentage of shareholders at the time were retail 
investors, even if they were protected by a stronger regulatory framework than in prior 
decades.
87
 Labor was kept at bay through compromises between management and unions, 
part of which were generous defined-benefit private pension plans providing retirement 
savings. These turned employees effectively into their employers’ creditors and created a 




 83.  For a discussion of the role of open markets and international competition for convergence in corporate 
governance, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the The-
ory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 239–41 (1999); 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 450–51; Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1, 1–2, 8–9 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe 
eds., 2003). 
 84.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
47–68 (1932) (discussing the prevalence of dispersed ownership in 1929). 
 85.  Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 
YALE L.J. 1927, 1948–56 (1993). 
 86.  See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 536–41 (1990); 
WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 204 (5th ed. 2016) (both discussing the SEC’s proxy rules and their effects on institutional in-
vestor activism). 
 87.  Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the Twenty-
First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1074 (2015) (“In the world of the Berle-Means corporation, shareholder 
powerlessness was a given”). 
 88.  Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 
2021 COVID-19 and Comparative Corporate Governance 571 
 
Continental European countries provide a sharp contrast to the United States in terms 
of the corporate governance structures in the period following World War II. Stock markets 
were much smaller relative to the size of the economy after World War II than in the Eng-
lish-speaking world.
89
 Depending on the country, one would see a different mix of family-
dominated firms (e.g., Italy), significant government ownership (e.g., France), or a strong 
role for local financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies (Germany).
90
 
Firms tended to be governed by controlling shareholders or coalitions of large sharehold-
ers.
91
 Employees often had a significant role, which was formalized through employment 
and labor laws that gave significant power to unions, for example through works councils 
that required labor or union input on key shop-floor decisions, thus giving more bargaining 
power to unions.
92
 In some jurisdictions, most prominently Germany, labor voice in cor-
porate governance was even more strongly formalized through employee representation on 
the board,
93
 likely in part to reduce the influence of powerful large shareholders.
94
 
In Germany in particular, the stock market never recovered from the Great Depres-
sion, with only a relatively small number of firms being publicly traded,
95
 and corporate 
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finance operating to a large degree through relationships with banks.
96
 Obviously, this is 
not to say that Germany or Continental Europe did not experience considerable economic 
success during the post-war decades, even relative to the United States.
97
 The way in which 
these countries did this was, however, very different, in a large part because of institutional 
choices taken in times of crisis. Outside investment by the general population played only 
a negligible role, in part because retirement income was provided by the government.
98
 
Families, large financial groups, industrial groups, and governments served as significant 
shareholders.
99






Similarly, Japan embarked on a new corporate governance trajectory after World War 
II. While its large firms had previously been dominated by the interests of controlling fam-
ily interests, these groups were broken up under the American occupation.
102
 The resulting 
corporate structure (cross-ownership groups or keiretsu) meant that firms within a con-
glomerate effectively controlled each other, leaving little influence for outside sharehold-
ers.
103
 At the same time, firms were adopting lifetime employment, meaning that a signif-
icant segment of workers would spend their entire career at the same company or within 
the same corporate group.
104
 Arguably, the political reason at the time was to reduce the 
risk of a swing further to the left in terms of economic policy and to appease a resurgent 
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 Lifetime employment complemented cross-ownership in that it 
matched a low influence of outside investors and arguably ensured that firms were domi-
nated by their own class of cadres.
106
 
The point of the examples of the United States, Germany, and Japan is not that each 
country’s firms are likely to react to COVID-19 in a certain way, but to illustrate that pe-
culiar historical contingencies often beget long-term structures. Each of the three countries 
achieved a measure of economic success with them in the decades to come. Both the Ger-
man and Japanese labor structures are sometimes thought to have been conducive to the 
development of high-skills workforces in a large-scale industrial context.
107
 Whatever their 
consequences, they were not necessarily intended for these goals, but rather put into place 
to address a peculiar current problem. 
Historically contingent radical changes such as the ones described subsequently tend 
to evolve gradually during politically calmer times. During the last decades of the 20th 
century, multiple corporate governance systems edged toward a more shareholder-oriented 
system. The United States was one of the jurisdictions leading the way in its move from 
managerial capitalism
108
 to shareholder capitalism.
109
 Arguably, U.S. corporations began 
to edge toward a shareholder-oriented around 1980, in which they were pushed ahead by a 
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number of developments. First, hostile takeovers—from which shareholders typically ben-
efit, arguably at the expense of other constituencies—began to shake up corporate America 
during this period.
110
 Second, on the academic level, Jensen and Meckling famously for-
malized agency theory in 1976,
111
 which began to be the predominant model with which 
financial economists as well as legal scholars used to explain corporate governance.
112
 
Third, business education was increasingly dominated by the objective of shareholder 
wealth maximization, thus influencing two generations of business leaders.
113
 Fourth, dur-
ing the 1990s, executive compensation began to be much more strongly geared toward 
setting incentives to increase share value, thereby intending to align managers’ interests 
with those of shareholders.
114
 Fifth, the ownership stake and influence of institutional in-
vestors in companies increased.
115
 Institutional retirement savings played a role in this, in 
part because pension plans needed to be funded, which paved the way to defined contribu-
tion plans such as 401(k)s, meaning that workers were invested in the market through in-
stitutional investors rather than expecting a pension from an employer.
116
 With this “re-
concentration of share ownership,” which continued into the 2000s, investors increasingly 
tended to be indirectly represented through institutions
117
 and commentators began to 
speak of a “shareholder-centric reality.”
118
 The Business Roundtable, a leading advocacy 
group of top management, announced its formal support for shareholder primacy only in 
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During the 1990s and 2000s, corporate governance scholars became increasingly 
aware of growing “convergence” toward a shareholder or “Anglo-Saxon” model, as an 
aspect of globalization.
120
 Laws and practices increasingly prioritized the interests of out-
side investors in many jurisdictions. Labor issues became more and more sidelined.
121
 In 
part, this trend was owed to the rising global scope of activity of institutional investors 
from the English-speaking countries, as well as of the trend for multinational corporations 
to tap capital markets.
122
 Proponents of convergence theories argued that a shareholder 
primacy model was more efficient, meaning that firms (and countries) following it would 
be more successful in the increasingly global marketplace characterized by open trade and 
investment. International institutions—such as the World Bank or the IMF—sometimes 
made the provision of finance dependent on the adoption of “best practices,” especially the 
OECD’s “Principles of Corporate Governance.”
123
 For example, legislatures across Eu-
rope implemented reforms intended to strengthen shareholders, in particular outside inves-
tors. The European “corporate governance movement” at the time was in part characterized 
by the adoption of corporate governance codes following the British “comply or explain” 
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 In addition, many countries introduced pro-shareholder reforms, such as the Ger-
man Control and Transparency Act of 1998,
125
 the French “Nouvelles régulations écono-
miques” of 2001,
126
 and the Italian reforms of 2004.
127
 The EU Commission’s “High Level 
Report of Company Law Experts” of 2002
128
 promoted a shareholder agenda, which was 
reflected in the 2007 Shareholder Rights Directive.
129
 With this trend paralleled in many 
parts of the world, Hansmann and Kraakman were famously able to identify the ascendancy 
of the shareholder model in corporate governance as the key piece to international conver-
gence in 2001, arguably because it was most efficient.
130
 
In addition, in recent years studies have found that firms are increasingly owned in 
part by the same set of institutional investors around the world. Retail investors and locally 
entrenched elites have been losing ground against mutual funds, hedge funds, and increas-
ingly passively managed index funds. That is not to say, however, that ownership structures 
are the same around the world. Large and controlling shareholders persist where they were 
before, but only to a slightly smaller degree.
131
 
The 2008–09 financial crisis did not lead to an initial rejection of the shareholder 
model or a reversal of the convergence phenomenon. To the contrary, policymakers and 
scholars around the world initially seemed to consider stronger shareholder power as part 
of the cocktail of instruments to address the pathologies brought to light by the financial 
crisis. The best case in point may be shareholder “say on pay” as an instrument to rein in 
runaway executive compensation. Following the U.K. model,
132
 many countries, including 
the United States, adopted mandatory (but not necessarily binding) votes on executive com-
pensation.
133
 This may be in part linked to the idea that institutional investors of various 
 
 124.  Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
INT’L REV. 376, 377–79 (2009). 
 125.  Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich [Law on Control and Transparency in 
the Corporate Sector] (KonTraG), 30 April 1998, BGBL I at 786. E.g., Ulrich Seibert, Control and Transparency 
in Business (KonTraG): Corporate Governance Reform in Germany, 10 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 70, 70 (1999). 
 126.  Loi 2001-420 du 15 mai 2001 relative aux nouvelles regulations économiques [Law 2001-420 of May 
15, 2001 on New Economic Regulations], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]; see Ben 
Clift, French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of Change and Hybridisation 
within Models of Capitalism, 55 POL. STUD. 546, 553–57 (2007) (explaining how the French government has 
taken a quasi-dirigiste [quasi-control of economic and social matters] approach by re-regulating French corporate 
governance and financial markets). 
 127.  See also Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSPS. 117, 127–37 (2007) (detailing the corporate governance reforms in France, Germany, and Italy). 
 128.  THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT ON A MODERN FRAMEWORK FOR 
COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (2002). 
 129.  Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise 
of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. No. L184/17 (implementing e.g., a record date 
system and facilitating voting for international investors). 
 130.  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 439. 
 131.  For recent corporate ownership data, see ADRIANA DE LA CRUZ ET AL., OWNERS OF THE WORLD’S 
LISTED COMPANIES (OECD CAPITAL MARKET SERIES 2019), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Owners-of-the-
Worlds-Listed-Companies.htm [https://perma.cc/7DAS-G2SY]; Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, Corporate 
Control Around the World, 75 J. FIN. 1191, 1205–08 (2020). 
 132.  Companies Act 2006, § 439 (UK). 
 133.  For the United States, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); for the EU, see Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the 
2021 COVID-19 and Comparative Corporate Governance 577 
 
types would increasingly be well-positioned to monitor management (or controlling share-
holders). The idea of “shareholder stewardship” got traction in the 2010s, and many coun-
tries introduced a stewardship code following the model of the United Kingdom. These 
codes are intended to ensure a beneficial impact of institutional investors on firms.
134
 How-
ever, during the 2010s, a countervailing tendency emerged against the trend favoring out-
side equity investors. Examples, which we will address in more depth below, include the 
increasing growth of “loyalty shares” in some European countries as an anti-takeover de-
vice,
135
 or a growing attractiveness of increased labor power in corporate governance, al-
beit surprisingly in arguably shareholder-oriented jurisdictions such as the United King-
dom and the United States.
136
 
The history of corporate governance in the 20th century illustrates two types of cor-
porate governance changes. First, deep structural roots were set in the aftermath of the 
crisis brought by the Depression and World War II. Different jurisdictions had to deal with 
political issues in a variety of ways, which were intended to address a problem at hand but 
created the tracks for long-term development. Along the way, jurisdictions proceeding 
within these tracks. Second, a more gradual development, such as the one of the late 20th 
century convergence movement, happened during a time of relative political tranquility. 
During this period, policymakers were able to focus on corporate governance issues, rather 
than larger political or distributive concerns, and focused on perceived inefficiencies. After 
all, this is the period when the concern of agency cost came into the core focus of the 
debate. 
COVID-19 came into the corporate governance world as a shock at the far tail end of 
the convergence. However, as general economic measures of international trade indicate 
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that the world has moved from “globalization” to “slowbalization,”
137
 corporate govern-
ance has shifted from convergence to a mixed picture after 2008. While in some areas, we 
have seen continued convergence toward a shareholder model, in others we are experienc-
ing a variety of developments across countries no longer in line with an ascendancy of pro-
shareholder structures. Thus, corporate governance seems to be converging and diverging 
concurrently, in a phenomenon one could describe as “slowvergence.” 
IV. THREE KEY COVID-19 TRENDS 
We now turn to corporate governance effects of the economic crisis triggered by 
COVID-19. We argue that corporations will be subject to principally three types of pres-
sures that will affect corporate governance, also in the long run. First, we discuss the move 
from “efficient” toward resilient corporate governance structures, considering both finan-
cial and labor aspects (Section IV.A), which, in spite of some debate, is a reverse of a 
precursory trend. We then discuss the return of nationalism (or protectionism) to corporate 
governance, which had previously persisted only in vestigial form (Section IV.B). We fi-
nally describe the resurgence of stakeholder models in corporate governance, which con-






A. The Turn from “Efficient” to Resilient Structures 
1. Corporate Fat and the Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow 
In production logistics and sales, firms have been moving toward a certain type of 
efficiency in recent decades. First, firms have created regional and sometimes global sup-
ply chains.
138
 Elements of the value chain are produced where they are cheapest, thus al-
lowing firms to benefit from economies of scale,
139
 individual countries’ comparative ad-
vantages and lower labor costs,
140
 as well as strategically placing production close to 
 
 137.  Supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 138.  Richard Baldwin, Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are 
Going, in GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 13, 17–20 (Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., 
2013); Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez, supra note 9, at 1691, 1695 (noting the regional nature of supply chains); 
Prema-chandra Athukorala et al., Global Supply Chains: Towards a Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, 
37 ECON. PAPERS 198, 198 (2018). 
 139.  E.g., Zdenko Segetlija & Davor Dujak, Retail Supply Chains and Efficiency of Retail Trade, 10 
LOGFORUM 319, 321 (2014) (noting that retail supply chains allow firms to concentrate certain functions in certain 
countries). 
 140.  John Zysman & Andrew Schwartz, Reunifying Europe in an Emerging World Economy: Economic 
Heterogeneity, New Industrial Options, and Political Choices, 36 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 405, 418 (1998); Bald-
win, supra note 138, at 30, 31, 36; Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez, supra note 9, at 1684–85 (discussing comparative 
advantage); Lennert C. Kaplan et al., Supply-Chain Trade and Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of the 2004 
European Union Enlargement, 26 REV. INT’L ECON. 495 (2018) (noting a difference between Western and Eastern 




 Second, firms have emphasized “just-in-time” logistics. This means 
that interim products are delivered to the production process only shortly before they are 
needed. This has the advantage that the capital is not tied up in inventory, thus making the 
production process leaner and reducing the firm’s financing needs.
142
 It does require de-
pendable transportation systems and reliable suppliers to achieve its intended effects;
143
 in 
other words, firms must operate in a low-risk environment.
144
 This is particularly true in 
integrated markets, such as the European Union, where there are normally only random 
border inspections within the Schengen zone, and no customs controls within the union. 
Consequently, firms have come to rely on cross-border deliveries to a larger extent.
145
 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, firms were increasingly forced to rely on larger inventory 
stocks (“just-in-case” logistics) and slower transportation methods (e.g., ocean carriage in-
stead of cargo flights) because of interrupted or clogged supply chains causing bottlenecks. 
Thus, firms have begun to bring supply chains closer to their home operations in anticipa-
tion of future lockdowns
146
 and other disruptions.
147
 
A parallel phenomenon has emerged in capital markets. Here, “efficiency” entails that 
capital can flow to its highest value use
148
 with little transaction costs. This is of course 
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Regimes and Knowledge Spillovers Through the Supply Chain, VOXEU (Mar. 29, 2019), https://voxeu.org/arti-
cle/border-regimes-and-knowledge-spillovers-through-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/2NDS-6U45] (discussing 
economic integration as a result of EU membership, which is enhanced by membership in the Schengen agree-
ment); see also Kaplan et al., supra note 140, at 481 (finding that the 2004 EU enlargement has served to integrate 
new member states into Western European supply chains). 
 146.  Julie Steinberg & Joe Wallace, As Inventories Swell, Companies Turn to Novel Strategies to Get 
Through Coronavirus Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-inventories-
swell-companies-turn-to-novel-strategies-to-get-through-coronavirus-crisis-11596888000 
[https://perma.cc/NGB7-VFD4]. 
 147.  Mike Cherney, Firms Want to Adjust Supply Chains Post-Pandemic, but Changes Take Time, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/firms-want-to-adjust-supply-chains-post-pan-
demic-but-changes-take-time-11609081200 [https://perma.cc/D7LF-EUVK]; see also Willy C. Shih, Global Sup-
ply Chains in a Post-Pandemic World, HARV. BUS. REV. 83, 86 (2020) (suggesting that manufacturers should 
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possible only when investors can disinvest from one company and invest in another com-
pany, as well as diversify their holdings.
149
 Unlike investors in a mutual fund, shareholders 
in a corporation cannot normally decide to sell back stock to the corporation at will. They 
may only sell them in the market, in which case a low-value use will result in downward 
pressure on the stock price, which is generally disfavored by management.
150
 Firms can 
forestall downward price pressure by returning capital to shareholders at their own volition, 
either through dividends or share repurchases.
151
 Sometimes they are essentially forced to 
return underused capital to stockholders in a hostile takeover.
152
 
Excess resources that remain in the firm and are not put to good use are thus often 
seen as detrimental and a potential source of agency cost. Managers are usually thought to 
have an incentive to retain excessive funds in the firm because it insulates them from mar-
ket discipline.
153
 Managers are more likely to take action increasing their own welfare (at 
the expense of shareholders) if they have discretion over cash.
154
 These “agency costs of 
free cash flow” can be countered with debt; if there is a constant interest burden to meet, 
managers have fewer options to squander unused funds.
155
 In light of this, repurchases of 
shares are often thought to be beneficial because they return unused cash to sharehold-
ers.
156
 In the United States, arguably, the free cash flow problem largely disappeared dur-
ing the 1980s with increased reliance on corporate debt.
157
 
In recent years, share repurchases have become more common,
158
 and an increasing 
 
Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 122, 137–39 (2015). 
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at 1, 10. 
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 The most simple explanation for buybacks is that it is efficient for 
firms with few investment opportunities that they should return capital to shareholders 
(who can invest it elsewhere more productively).
160
 Apart from that, managers often prefer 
repurchases to dividends because they reduce the number of outstanding shares, increase 
earnings per share, and signal to the market that their stock is undervalued.
161
 Finally, the 
signaling theory of share buybacks posits that well-run firms are better able to operate with 
smaller amounts of cash. Repurchases are therefore more costly for badly run firms, which 
is why a buyback allows well-run firms to signal their quality to investors.
162
 
Share repurchases have become the subject of criticism from various sources in recent 
years. Critics argue that firms could use funds for more desirable purposes, such as capital 
expenditures, to pay workers better, or to better develop the business.
163
 Others are con-
cerned that firms are becoming short-termist and sacrifice long-term investment for quick 
returns for shareholders.
164
 In this view, increased earnings per share after a repurchase are 
only window-dressing and do not represent long-term value creation.
165
 Managers may 
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 161.  Stanley Block, Should Banks Repurchase Their Own Shares?, 24 BANK ACCT. & FIN. 29, 29, 31 (2010) 
(reporting surveys among bank managers showing the signaling effect as a major motivation for repurchases); 
Miller & Prondzinski, supra note 160, at 50; Bruce Dravis, Dilution, Disclosure, Equity Compensation, and Buy-
backs, 74 BUS. LAW. 631, 632 (2019) (discussing earnings per share). 
 162.  E.g., Fried, supra note 160, at 441–45 (explaining how signaling theory makes it possible to credibly 
announce the stock price is too low); Jacob Oded, Why Do Firms Announce Open-Market Repurchase Programs?, 
18 REV. FIN. STUD. 271, 274 (2005) (providing a hypothetical signaling model); Matthew T. Billett & Miaomiao 
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1165, 1167 (2016) (“Myriad theoretical studies show that payout policy can signal 
insider information to outside investors and mitigates the effects of asymmetric information”); Alana M. Mackey 
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gain from them because of the way in which executive compensation plans reward in-
creases in stock price.
166
 In addition, politicians have criticized repurchases for their pur-
ported redistributive effects from workers to shareholders.
167
 
COVID-19 as an external shock to the corporate governance system led to a 30% 
reduction in buybacks in 2020.
168
 Over the medium and long term, firms may hold large 
amounts of cash to protect themselves against cash flow shocks.
169
 Efficiency-oriented 
structures that do well in calm waters may not be best suited to survive a storm that hits the 
economy as a whole. For example, Warren Buffett suggested that the conglomerate he 
controls, Berkshire Hathaway, is well-positioned in the present situation because it holds 
significant amounts of cash reserves.
170
 In uncertain times, significant reserves may thus 
make a firm more resilient to shocks. Referring to a phrase coined by Chicago economist 
Luigi Zingales, Oxford law professor John Armour has called this phenomenon “survival 
of the fattest.”
171
 In his study of the trucking industry, Zingales found that when an exog-
enous shock happened—namely deregulation—firms started to compete on price, which 
resulted in the elimination chiefly of the more highly leveraged firms from the market.
172
 
Understandably, the aversion to payouts to shareholders is influencing policies relat-
ing to government bailouts. For example, the U.S. CARES Act requires that federal loans 
and guarantees may only be made to firms that commit not to repurchase equity or pay 
 
of earnings per share, and saving personal taxes). 
 166.  Dittmar, supra note 160, at 335; Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 151, at 165; David Bendig et al., 
Share Repurchases and Myopia: Implications on the Stock and Consumer Markets, 82 J. MKTG. 19, 24–25 (2018); 
Nitzan Shilon, Pay for Destruction: The Stock Buybacks That Make CEOs Rich but Impoverish Their Firms 
(2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678734 [https://perma.cc/AX5W-BH44]; Fei Leng & Kevin Min Zhao, In-
sider Trading Around Open-Market Share Repurchases, 38 J. ECON. FIN. 461 (2014) (discussing insider trading 
behavior around repurchases); see generally Jesse M. Fried, Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open 
Market Repurchases, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2005) (suggesting that managers may use repurchases to drive up 
the stock price before selling stock). 
 167.  Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Schumer and Sanders: Limit Corporate Stock Buybacks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-bernie-sanders.html 
[https://perma.cc/B8HP-9TFG]. 
 168.  Randall Smith, Stock Buybacks: What Every Investor Needs to Know, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2020, 11:31 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-buybacks-what-every-investor-needs-to-know-11607185864 
[https://perma.cc/8RXZ-SLZC]. 
 169.  Thomas W. Bates et al., Why Do U.S. Firms Hold Much More Cash Than They Used To?, 64 J. FIN. 
1985, 1988–89 (2009). 
 170.  Theron Mohamed, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Has a Record $137 Billion Investor Cash 
Pile. Here’s Why the Investor Will Be Frustrated by That Fact, BUS. INSIDER (May 8, 2020, 6:33 AM), 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/why-warren-buffett-unhappy-berkshire-hathaway-record-137-
billion-cash-2020-4-1029181516 [https://perma.cc/Y5QH-Q5LX]. 
 171.  John Armour et al., The COVID-19 Crisis and Its Aftermath: University of Oxford and Imperial College 
London Session, ECGI (Apr. 30, 2020), https://ecgi.global/video/covid-19-crisis-and-its-aftermath-university-ox-
ford-and-imperial-college-london-session [https://perma.cc/35JH-39FJ]. 
 172.  Luigi Zingales, Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest? Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry, 53 
J. FIN. 905, 906 (1998). 
2021 COVID-19 and Comparative Corporate Governance 583 
 
dividends within the next twelve months.
173
 Similar restrictions apply in European coun-
tries.
174
 Generally, share repurchases are facing increased scrutiny by the public, especially 
when the government steps up to help the economy during the pandemic.
175
 In addition, 




In the comparative dimension, there appear to be chiefly two explanations of interna-
tional differences in cash holdings. First, some studies suggest that firms in countries where 
investors are less well-protected against managerial agency costs tend to hold more cash.
177
 
Second, other studies suggest that firms in countries with certain cultural traits, especially 
“uncertainty avoidance” on the well-known Hofstede scale,
178
 have larger cash holdings 
relative to their size.
179
 However, some of the international differences are likely driven by 
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trend toward larger cash holdings in the United States during the early 2000s, for example, 
was driven by tech firms trading on NASDAQ.
181
 
A phenomenon paralleling cash holdings is “empire-building” by management, which 
is often thought to be another source of agency cost, especially when firms merge to form 
conglomerates.
182
 The main problem here is that shareholders can better diversify their 
capital by spreading it across firms; from there, it is not necessarily an advantage in a spe-
cific firm being diversified.
183
 Moreover, managers have more opportunities to engage in 
wasteful activities across multiple divisions.
184




On the positive side, large conglomerates (or firms) may not necessarily be better 
positioned to survive a crisis in comparison to smaller ones. However, firms that are better 
internally diversified may be better equipped because they are active in a larger number of 
lines of businesses.
186
 If a firm’s cashflows are consequently less variable, the more prof-
itable divisions may be able to cross-subsidize the harder-hit ones, thus enabling the whole 
firm to survive.
187
 Thus, while the creation of conglomerates is often thought to be an 
example of an agency cost,
188
 firms with more diversified cashflow streams may be better 
positioned to survive a severe crisis with some bruises. Conglomerates are no longer com-
mon in the United States, in part because of takeovers in the 1980s and 1990s,
189
 but they 
persist in other parts of the world, such as East Asia.
190
 
Overall, it may well be that firms carrying more “fat”—either in the form of cash 
holdings or internal diversification—are better positioned to survive the initial COVID-19 
shock. Similar to Zingales’ findings in the U.S. trucking industry after deregulation,
191
 the 
“fatter” firms might persist. It is much more difficult to make predictions across countries. 
First, the initial population of firms will differ. If a law is not effective in protecting share-
holders against agency cost and a cultural trait of uncertainty avoidance are indeed drivers 
of cash hoarding,
192
 then these factors will already have shaped the existing population of 
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Investment, 55 J. FIN. 35, 36 (2000) (“[M]odel[ing] the distortion that internal power struggles can generate in the 
allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified form”). 
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voidable?, 54 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 55, 58 (2002) (discussing cross-subsidization between divisions of a 
conglomerate); see also Rajan & Zingales, supra note 148, at 44–45 (discussing specific examples). 
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BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981) (suggesting that conglomerate mergers allowed managers to diversify their employment 
risk); but see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 SCI. 745, 746 (1990) 
(speculating that conglomerates can allocate funds efficiently by creating internal capital markets). 
 189.  Rock, supra note 109, at 1921. 
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firms, e.g., the industry in which a jurisdiction typically excels. In addition, idiosyncratic 
factors, including whether a country’s government is likely to bail out firms in the private 
sector, will play a role. 
A further factor influencing the short-run survival of firms is whether a country’s 
bankruptcy system is effective at allowing firms to continue after reorganization, as with 
Chapter 11 in the United States, or whether insolvency is more likely to result in a breakup 
during liquidation of the firm.
193
 During the past two decades, many countries have at-
tempted to gear their bankruptcy laws more strongly toward reorganization and firm sur-
vival with a new capital structure.
194
 To the extent an effective reorganization system is in 
place, firms as such will likely survive with new owners.
195
 
The more interesting question is whether COVID-19 will not only be a one-time shock 
to the economy but create a generally less stable economic environment, for example, be-
cause of recurring lockdowns. This would not mean that a firm should accumulate as much 
fat as possible and hoard mountains of cash to survive or create conglomerates to mitigate 
the effects of potential shocks through diversification. However, the presence of recurring 
shocks may change the capital structure tradeoff when it comes to corporate fat. Under all 
circumstances, firms may have to balance the disadvantages of fat, such as increased 
agency costs, with its advantages, such as increased resiliency to crisis. For each firm, the 
optimal position on the tradeoff will also depend on other characteristics of the firm. For 
example, in a firm with large shareholders, managerial agency cost is usually not particu-
larly significant. 
Overall, it is still likely that the optimal point in the tradeoff will shift toward more 
corporate fat compared to the more stable pre-COVID environment across countries. One 
could speculate whether firms in some countries are more likely to be better positioned to 
survive shocks than others. It appears that the bankruptcy system will be less important for 
the long-run impact than for the initial shock. As economic shocks become more common, 
equity investors will—over time—increasingly insist on mechanisms being put into place 
that avoid shock-induced bankruptcy ex ante, which will likely include increased corporate 
fat. The survival of firms will depend largely on their adaptability. To the extent that coun-
tries do not inhibit cash hoarding through tax penalties, firms in most jurisdictions should 
be capable of adjustment. The creation of conglomerates and internal diversification may 
be more complex. Firms in jurisdictions that already have conglomerate structures will 
likely have a head start. We will return to this discussion in Section IV.C.3 when we outline 
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CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 122, at 1003, 1006–08 (contrasting liquidation- and reorgani-
zation-oriented bankruptcy procedures). 
 194.  See, e.g., Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, The Future of Reorganization Procedures in the Era of Pre‑Insol-
vency Law, 21 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 829, 833–35 (2020) (surveying reforms). 
 195.  Many countries have amended their bankruptcy laws to let distressed companies avoid involuntary liq-
uidation during COVID-19. For a survey, see OECD, NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RELATED 
INITIATIVES DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS, 25–35 (2020), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/National-corporate-
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macro-consequences for the evolution of corporate governance post-COVID-19. 
2. Relational Equity and Debt, and Corporate Embeddedness 
A related aspect of resilience could be described as a corporation’s embeddedness into 
a larger economic network. A corporation can be referred to as more “embedded” if it is 
more strongly linked to other entities or individuals that are likely to provide aid in a crisis. 
In large part, this relates to the question of ownership structure. We have already dis-
cussed differences in ownership structures across countries. Traditionally, U.S. and U.K. 
corporate governance have been characterized by dispersed ownership, where shareholders 
are diversified and typically hold only a small percentage of shares, thus allowing manage-
ment independently.
196
 Most other jurisdictions, including wealthy industrialized countries 
in Europe and Asia, have long exhibited concentrated ownership, where controlling share-
holders or coalitions of large shareholders exercise a significant influence on the firm.
197
 
The views that have been most influential on corporate law scholarship typically consider 
concentrated ownership as an aberration (in spite of its prevalence), at least as far as agency 
costs are concerned. According to the “law matters” thesis, concentrated ownership persists 
because of bad corporate law that inadequately protects minority investors.
198
 Other views 
suggest a political influence that strengthens labor institutions; if these undermine effective 




However, a different type of explanation sees corporate governance not only as fo-
cused on the agency costs between managers, inside shareholders, and outside sharehold-
ers, but rather as a set of institutional complementarities. Thus, concentrated ownership is 
not necessarily a dysfunctional consequence of bad law or politics but serves as a useful 
function in combination with other elements of the corporate governance system. In par-
ticular, scholars have long distinguished between countries characterized by an “arm’s 
length” (or outsider) and a “control-oriented” (or insider) financial system.
200
 Arm’s length 
 
 196.  Supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 197.  Supra notes 90–106 and accompanying text. 
 198.  Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta 
et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1145–51 (1998); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as 
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 641, 647–48 (1999) (suggesting that federal securities laws are the protections needed for dispersed share-
holders that supports the growth of the securities market); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Precon-
ditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 834–35 (2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Mat-
ter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 461–65 (2001). 
But see Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53 
(2018) (suggesting that private benefits of control up to a certain degree help to ensure necessary long-term com-
mitment by large equity investors). 
 199.  Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 539, 542 (2000); ROE, supra note 26, at 162; see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 90 (discussing 
corporate governance outcomes as a set of complex coalitions). 
 200.  E.g., Berglöf, supra note 101, at 159–64 (differentiating between arms-length and control-oriented fi-
nance); DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 4, at 64 (exploring the globalization of corporate governance); Leuz, 
supra note 101, at 236–37 (comparing two stylized approaches to reporting regulation); see also Reinhard H. 
Schmidt & Marcel Tyrell, Financial Systems, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 3 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 
333, 334 (1997) (contrasting market-based and bank-based financial systems); Gelter, supra note 92, at 176–81 
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systems rely on anonymous relations—mediated mainly through public and stock and bond 
markets—to provide companies with finance, where providers of finance rely on legal 
rights and their enforcement.
201
 In control-oriented systems, the major providers of finance 
(such as banks or large shareholders) tend to intervene to secure their rights (which is pos-
sible because such investors hold larger stakes).
202
 Each system has advantages and disad-
vantages. While outside systems allow for relatively fast capital flows and reduce the firm’s 
risk of being at the mercy of the opportunism of another party (e.g., private benefits of 
control taken by a controlling shareholder), inside systems require long-term relation-
ships.
203
 Relational systems appear to have an advantage in environments with a great deal 
of uncertainty, for example, because of inadequate legal protections.
204
 
Some scholars take this argument further and have suggested that different financial 
market and labor market institutions stand in a complementary relationship with each other. 
Empirically, labor and employment law strengthening the position of workers tends to pre-
vail in jurisdictions with concentrated ownership.
205
 One body of scholarship, the so-called 
“varieties of capitalism” theory, classifies socio-economic systems in different countries 
into “liberal” capitalist systems (such as the United States and the United Kingdom) on the 
one hand, and “coordinated” capitalist systems on the other hand. While the former relies 
mainly on arm’s length market transactions between individual actors to coordinate eco-
nomic activity, the latter relies more often on aggregate interest groups, such as associa-
tions representing business interests and unions which would then engage in long-term 
collective agreements.
206
 Firms in coordinated systems tend to make use of internal labor 
markets and specific human capital commitment to a larger extent, which requires a long-
term cooperative arrangement to avoid opportunism from either side.
207
 However, such a 
labor system requires a level of commitment by shareholders to ensure to employees that 




(describing institutional complementarities between the strength of shareholder and labor power). 
 201.  Schmidt & Tyrell, supra note 200, at 343; Leuz, supra note 101, at 237. 
 202.  Berglöf, supra note 101, at 159–64. 
 203.  Rajan & Zingales, supra note 148, at 40; Leuz, supra note 101, at 237; DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 
4, at 68 (discussing bank-based corporate governance systems); see also FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, 
COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 19–22 (2000) (analyzing advantages and disadvantages). 
 204.  Rajan & Zingales, supra note 148, at 41 (“Relationship-based systems can survive in environments 
where laws are poorly drafted or contracts not enforced.”). 
 205.  ROE, supra note 26, at 52; Belloc & Pagano, supra note 94, at 107. 
 206.  See generally Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES 
OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8–9 (Peter A. Hall & Da-
vid Soskice eds., 2001); RICHARD W. CARNEY, CONTESTED CAPITALISM 3 (2010) (both discussing the distinction 
between the two types of capitalism). 
 207.  DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 4, at 75–76. 
 208.  It is not entirely clear whether and under which circumstances a dispersed or a concentrated ownership 
structure is more conducive to commitment. For a theoretical model, see Giulio Ecchia et al., Corporate Govern-
ance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 457 (2012); see also 
Gelter, supra note 92, at 176–81; Belloc & Pagano, supra note 94; Gelter, supra note 121, at 48–50; Mark J. Roe 
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A major takeaway from these theoretical frameworks is that some firms are more em-
bedded into a network of long-term relationships than others, and we see more of them in 
some countries than in others. Arguably, embeddedness can be an advantage in times of 
crisis.
209
 First, large shareholders typically find it hard to disinvest and cannot generate 
market pressures toward a low stock price by selling. Blocks can only be sold strategically. 
Moreover, as strategic investors, they have a non-diversified position that creates an incen-
tive for them to ensure the survival of the corporation. This is true most of all when the 
government is a key shareholder of a firm, in which case it will typically pursue political 
goals with its ownership stake. But even in the case of family shareholders or key industrial 
or industry shareholders, firms may benefit from being integrated into a larger, long-term 
corporate network or group. Key shareholders, if they are firms less affected by a crisis, or 
if they are a government or family with a long-term interest in the survival of the firm, may 
be more inclined to bail out a corporation in crisis. In this vein, evidence from the initial 
COVID-19 shock in Italy suggests that family-controlled firms were more likely to sur-
vive.
210





tion, family owners may have a long-term connection with their workforce or the commu-




Another structure that can provide resiliency are business networks with cross-own-
ership, such as a Japanese keiretsu.
214
 Much like in a conglomerate as described in the 
previous section, the group as a whole will typically be diversified and in part function as 
a unit, which may allow it to shield individual firms from harm if they are more affected 
by shock than others in the group. With the “main bank” playing a key role in Japanese 
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In other jurisdictions, typically corporate groups take different forms, e.g., with py-
ramidal ownership structures
216
 or with industrial companies holding considerable stakes 
in other firms in related industries. Group integration is often thought not to be beneficial 
for outside investors because controlling shareholders may self-deal or otherwise capture 
private benefits of control.
217
 In this vein, the law and finance literature has often posited 
that minority shareholder protection will reduce ownership concentration because there are 
fewer rents to gain.
218
 However, group integration often means that firms have made rela-
tionship-specific investments. They will repeatedly deal with each other, which implies 
that products in different stages of the production cycle may match each other, or logistical 
structures are coordinated.
219
 Thus, in a number of countries, the law takes group structures 
into account and allows for a more lenient approach, e.g., in the treatment of self-dealing 
transactions.
220
 Consequently, firms within corporate groups are interested in other firms 
within the group with which they are coordinated to survive. Of course, being organized as 
a group (rather than as a unitary firm) allows risk to be cabined within individual firms that 
could be permitted to go out of business. However, to the extent that group integration with 
a struggling firm is advantageous for other group firms, they will be more interested in 
organizing a rescue. 
Finally, a similar argument can be made for (partial) government ownership of firms. 
The government may provide companies with patient capital, which may allow them to 
better withstand crises.
221
 In addition, government connections may endow corporations 
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 221.  Sergio G. Lazzarini & Aldo Musacchio, State Ownership Reinvented? Explaining Performance Differ-
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 222.  See Christine Zhenwei Qiang & Georgiana Pop, State-Owned Enterprises and COVID-19: Policy Prin-
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Overall, we can summarize these various phenomena as “embeddedness,” which en-
compass not only corporate ownership structures, long-term lending relationships, and cus-
tomer-supplier relationships, but also possibly constructive long-term relationships with 
other stakeholders such as employees. Rajan and Zingales describe relationship-based fi-
nancial systems as creating a system with “intertemporal cross-subsidies.”
223
 We can gen-
eralize this point to various types of embeddedness, where the different players provide 
insurance for each other. Because they enjoy the advantageous continued existence of other 
players, they will have an incentive to orchestrate rescues, provide funding, and exert po-
litical pressures that make a government bailout more likely. There is no legal obligation, 
but embeddedness is making survival more likely. 
Thus, if embeddedness permits a firm to better survive systemic shocks in a COVID-
19 world with a great degree of uncertainty, we may expect different forms of embed-
dedness to become more prevalent. This may include concentrated ownership structures 
and corporate groups of various shades, but also long-term lending and labor relationships. 
As for corporate “fat,” ownership concentration and group integration entail various costs 
and benefits. In stable times, ownership dispersion may be cost-minimizing for most pub-
licly traded firms. Whatever the costs and benefits otherwise, resilience may tip the scale 
further in favor of ownership concentration. Embeddedness in general may serve as a de-
fense mechanism in a more uncertain environment. 
3. Human Capital and the Value of a Healthy Labor Force 
i. Building a Resilient Workforce 
While the two preceding subsections have addressed the financial or capital side of 
corporate governance, COVID-19 may also have an impact on labor and how corporate 
management interacts with its workforce. The interests of workers are often thought to be 
outside the purview of corporate law, given that employees are not formally residual claim-
ants like shareholders, and their interests are taken into account either by private contract 
or employment law.
224
 However, employees are often in fact in a similar position as resid-
ual claimants, as they may have made firm-specific investment in their human capital
225
 
and have therefore transfer costs when moving to another employer.
226
 Another possible 
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ployment Contracts, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2291, 2311–37 (Orley Aschenfelter & David Card 
eds., 1991); David Neumark, Productivity, Compensation, and Retirement, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PENSIONS 
AND RETIREMENT INCOME 721, 722 (Gordon Clark, Alicia Munnell & J. Michael Orszag eds., 2006); Fauver & 
Fuerst, supra note 107, at 679; Greenfield, supra note 224, at 302–03. 
 226.  For example, a move may be prohibitively costly or impossible because of locally invested social cap-
ital. E.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND 
ROUTE 128 35 (1994) (quoting an engineer contrasting the difficulty of getting another job in the same industry 
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way in which employees are “tied” to a particular employer are (defined benefit) pension 
plans, which sometimes create incentives to stay with a particular employer until retire-
ment.
227
 These factors are sometimes brought forward as reasons why employees should 
play a role in corporate governance. Economic models suggest that employees may be sub-
ject to “holdup,” i.e., an opportunistic renegotiation of their contracts and work arrange-
ments. If they are supported by protections making holdup less likely, they will therefore 
be less likely to allow themselves to be exposed to such a risk, e.g., by avoiding specific 
human capital investment.
228
 Employee representation on the board, including German co-
determination, has thus sometimes been interpreted as an efficiency-enhancing corporate 
governance mechanism, with possible advantages in certain industries.
229
 
COVID-19 is adding another angle to the human capital creation, namely the resili-
ence of the workforce to the pandemic.
230
 Employers will want workers to avoid contagion, 
especially because it could lead to a “clustered” outbreak within the firm, which could shut 
down production for significant amounts of time and result in bad publicity.
231
 
Besides physical adjustments to the workplace, regular testing regimes and vac-
cines,
232
 the key to healthy employees will likely be found in the makeup of the workforce 
and its conduct relating to health in prevention, hygiene, monitoring, and social conduct. 
Since the outbreak of the pandemic, the focus on prevention and general interest in a 
healthy lifestyle has increased rapidly in terms of quality and quantity.
233
 Self-monitoring 
of health status and prevention through a holistic lifestyle has quickly leveraged into novel 
competitive advantages in all affected economies. Those who are healthier have better pre-
requisites for delving through COVID-19 with relatively little impact. Prevention has be-
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come the cornerstone of the health system, putting emphasis on a conscientious diet fea-




Corporate leadership of the future will, therefore likely not only address hygiene, gen-
eral healthcare, and crisis management but also put an emphasis on prevention. Corporate 
medicine requirements will focus rather on the prevention of diseases instead of just trying 
to reduce financial risks via insurance. In an overall global emergency and restorative med-
ical care cost escalation; corporate managers will need to grow awareness for the efficiency 
of health promotion and prophylaxis before out-of-control community spread risks within 
the firm, and key teams or production sites are crippled by prolonged sick leaves. As the 
coronavirus pandemic is fueled by human interaction and unfavorable health pre-condi-
tions; instead of just curing symptoms, practicing epidemic hygiene will gain momentum 
to secure a stable, healthy, and sustainable workforce. A growing literature is arguing that 
the pandemic must be treated by considering the entire context of hygiene, preventive 
healthcare, and illness from a systems biology perspective focusing on an eco-friendly 
diet.
235
 In this view, COVID-19 will likely produce a shift towards prevention as a corpo-
rate team-learning asset to ease the general healthcare risk of corporations alongside lifting 
the burden on the healthcare system. 
Thus, the development of “healthy human capital” will have to become a priority for 
firms as a matter of business success in the future.
236
 To that end, firms may take various 
measures. Ex ante, firms will want to hire employees that do not belong to a risk group 
because employees who are immune or less likely to fall seriously ill are more likely to 
remain productive. To the extent legally permissible, they might be interested in employ-
ees’ genetic predispositions and overall health status as indicators for prevalence, but also 
environmental conditions, such as living arrangements and social habits. Employees in risk 
groups but also older labor populations will have a natural disadvantage.
237
 Already now 
we see that the elderly are 50% more likely to be laid off during the current pandemic 
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As for favorable or unfavorable environmental conditions, those living alone or within a 
nuclear family will be less susceptible to infection, as will be employees who do not habit-
ually attend gatherings conducive to contagion. 
Ex post, corporations may have stronger incentives to monitor and control the behav-
ior of employees. They may require vaccination, but also start integrating health-promoting 
lifestyles and foster prevention implementation in guided sports events or nutrition semi-
nars as team-building requirements.
239
 The prevention efforts of further coronavirus waves 
or subsequent pandemics will include measures for the development of the immune system 
and general resilience through personalized diagnostics and nutrition. Corporate team-
building and collective learning events may center on nutrition, hygiene, and health moni-
toring of one’s own but also others’ health. Employees will be sensitized to detecting un-
favorable, risky social norms that may spread the virus. Sick leaves will become a new risk 
management asset to ward off superspreaders. 
In addition, firms will likely use technological innovation to mitigate health risks.
240
 
Not only are holistic preventive healthcare measures the clear winners of the COVID-19 
crisis; but so are digitization trends that have already emerged prior to the arrival of the 
novel coronavirus, which now broke the ongoing digitalization market disruption.
241
 AI, 
algorithms, robotics and big data insights also entered the medical field, which raise med-
ical prevention possibilities to a new digitalized level.
242
 Efficiency, precision, and high 
quality output are clear advantages of AI, robots and big data in healthcare.
243
 Today’s 
healthcare is, for instance, based on mobile monitoring. More than ever before are AI and 
the analysis of large amounts of data used to predict, prevent, diagnose, and heal. Analysis 
of large data allows group behavior prediction and inferences about prevalence and trend 
forecasts for preventive health care. For example, health apps map the status of the popu-
lation to contain contagion. Bluetooth tracking of medical aids helps with overcoming bot-
tleneck logistics, prevents corruption, and enables the protection of the privacy of vulner-
able patients. 
To summarize, it seems likely that a prolonged pandemic means that firms will not 
only have to develop a more resilient financial structure, but also more resilient human 
capital by taking health measures for employees. A question that has come up in some 
countries is whether coordination of health improvement efforts should be subsidized by 
the public. Employers themselves might otherwise have incentives to underinvest because 
part of the cost of contagion will be borne by individuals not working for the employer 
deciding about such measures. In other words, firms will have incentives to take their own 
bottom line into account when engaging in health management practice but maybe not 
benefits to the wider public. 
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 242.  Julia Margarete Puaschunder, Stakeholder Perspectives on Artificial Intelligence (AI), Robotics and 
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A possible public policy intervention to counter this possibility is illustrated by the 
German Prevention Act of 2015,
244
 which emphasizes health in general through preventive 
means. The government thereby subsidizes corporations to reduce overall healthcare costs 
and minimize human sickness risks with special attention to support the whole-rounded 
well-being of vulnerable and minority groups.
245
 According to the Act, employers are en-
couraged to take measures to diminish the concentration of obesity, diabetes, drugs and 
drug abuse, and severe previous illnesses, to name a few areas of concern, by shaping life-
style with eco-friendly consumption, social health risks reduction plans featuring precau-
tion, monitoring team sports, and collective exercise. 
ii. Consequences for the Relationship Between Capital and Labor 
It is a more complex question if COVID-19 will affect the relationship between capital 
and labor by changing the relative bargaining power of those interest groups. Given the 
different institutional bargaining positions of these groups across countries, we might see 
quite different outcomes in diverse corporate governance systems. In the previous Section, 
we have already touched upon the role of workers’ different skill levels and types of 
skills.
246
 The COVID-19 lockdowns and the increasing acceptance of remote work
247
 have 
added another dimension, namely whether an employee’s job can be done remotely or not. 
Table 1 categorizes jobs in terms of the skill level of employees and the degree of digitiza-
tion. 











Traditionally, one would expect high-skilled workers to have a higher level of bar-
gaining power (both individually and collectively) because they are harder to replace in a 
specific firm.
248
 Low-skilled workers that can easily be replaced in the case of long-term 
 
 244.  GESETZ ZUR STÄRKUNG DER GESUNDHEITSFÖRDERUNG UND DER PRÄVENTION 
(PRÄVENTIONSGESETZ—PRÄVG) [LAW TO STRENGTHEN HEALTH PROMOTION AND PREVENTION (PREVENTION 
ACT—PREVG)], July 17, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] No. 1/31, 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/101578/122461/F-43007703/bgbl115s1368_109745.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8HN3-GJN9]. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Supra notes 223–229 and accompanying text. 
 247.  E.g., Annie Gasparro & Sharon Terlep, Consumer Brands Bet Working from Home Is Here to Stay, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2020 8:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-brands-bet-working-from-home-
is-here-to-stay-11609065000 [https://perma.cc/Y7W8-FDJU] (explaining that brands are investing in factories 
aimed at production for post-pandemic remote workers). 
 248.  E.g., Anat Alon-Beck, Times They Are a-Changin’: When Tech Employees Revolt!, 80 MD. L. REV. 120 
(2021) (arguing that employees in firms such as Facebook or Google have been able to engage in public-policy 
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sickness are unlikely to have any bargaining power vis-à-vis their employer. 
Groups of skilled employees whose jobs are non-digitalized may come out of the cri-
sis with an advantage (provided they are in a “survivor” industry). Skilled employees in 
whom the firm has invested considerably are in a better position to insist on protective 
measures and may use the opportunity to renegotiate working conditions and benefits to 
their advantage. Such employees may have an enhanced bargaining position if it is more 
difficult to hire and, most of all, train new workers under social distancing conditions and 
enhance prevention-attentive group norms. 
In such industries where employees have to come together for work coordination, re-
structuring costs to invest in a pandemic-resistant workspace will likely increase. Each 
worker will have to do her part to protect the workplace from an outbreak potentially af-
fecting a large number of individuals. In other words, individuals will have an incentive to 
underinvest in the optimal effort to avoid contagion because part of the cost will be borne 
by co-workers or remote individuals in the form of greater infection risk. To counter un-
derinvestment, employers either need to engage in potentially costly monitoring or provide 
compliant employees with rewards. A third, alternative strategy might be to permit health 
coordination under the aegis of a union. Strengthening employee representation could, 
however, have the long-run effect of shifting bargaining power from capital to healthy la-
bor. 
However, recent experience under pandemic conditions suggests that remote work is 
more feasible in industries with more highly educated employees.
249
 While such industries 
may have a greater chance of survival, it is not clear whether this is beneficial for employ-
ees. If high-skills jobs have been digitalized and can be performed remotely, employees 
may have become more easily replaceable because of “social distancing.” First, firms will 
not need to spend as many resources on avoiding contagion in the workplace. Second, with 
home office work gaining acceptance, employers will likely have access to a large labor 
pool. Since firms no longer need to hire employees in one geographic region, they will be 
facing more outside competition. Competing workers may be based in any part of the coun-
try, or maybe even the world. To a certain extent, workers may be able to accept jobs in 
locations remote from the place of living. Overall, this means that such workers will be 
less dependent on nearby employers, and employers will be less dependent on specific 
workers located in the vicinity of their places of business. This will not happen if employ-
ees’ human capital is firm-specific because of the nature of the work. However, if it is firm-
specific, largely because of their geographic location, workers and employees will be less 
tied to each other. Workers in such fields will therefore grow more flexible, with their 
human capital becoming less firm-specific and more generally applicable. Thus, except in 
professions where skilled workers are scarce, on the margins we can expect a shift in bar-
gaining power from workers to capital. Consequently, labor bargaining power vis-à-vis 
their employer will likely be reduced. However, they may also have more outside oppor-
tunities. 
Overall, it seems likely that we will see a greater bifurcation within the workforce 
 
oriented activism because they are hard to replace due to their specific training).  
 249.  Alexander W. Bartik et al., What Jobs Are Being Done at Home During the COVID-19 Crisis? Evidence 
from Firm-Level Surveys 3, 8 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 20-138, 2020), https://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w27422. 
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between “digitalized” and “non-digitized” jobs. In the international dimension, possible 
policy justifications for employee representation would be reduced if employees are less 
tied to specific employers. However, it is difficult to predict trends for specific jurisdic-
tions. One could speculate that factors—such as language skills—play a role as well. To 
take a familiar example, the (relatively low-skill) work of telephone customer service has 
been outsourced to India in English-speaking countries during the past decades. Countries 
whose languages are not as widely spoken have generally not been subject to this develop-
ment. To the extent that national languages are still important in higher education jobs, 
increased home office work may therefore add much less to the fluidity of employer-em-
ployee relations. 
B. The Return of Nationalism in Corporate Governance 
“Nationalism” or “protectionism” have often been observed in corporate law, and they 
have generally been criticized by scholars.
250
 Often, policymakers monitor foreign owner-
ship of domestic firms, often because of national security issues.
251
 For example, Western 
governments have become increasingly concerned about a high reliance on China, for in-
stance regarding critical minerals
252
 and dependence on supply chains in key industries—
such as pharmaceuticals or automotive involving that country.
253
 In the summer of 2020, 
the Japanese government tried to set financial incentives for firms to bring key industries 
 
 250.  Wolf-Georg Ringe & Ulf Bernitz, Company Law and Economic Protectionism—An Introduction, in 
COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 1 (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2011); Pargendler, 
supra note 14, at 2937. 
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Energy and Mineral Assets by Foreign Entities, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 995, 997, 1004–07 (2014) (discussing 
limitations on foreign ownership in the oil and gas industry). 
 252.  Yujia He, The Trade-Security Nexus and U.S. Policy Making in Critical Minerals, 59 RES. POL. 238, 
238 (2018); Exec. Order No. 13817, 83 Fed. Reg. 23295 (Dec. 20, 2017). 
 253.  Joe McDonald, Companies Prodded to Rely Less on China, but Few Respond, AP NEWS (June 29, 
2020), https://apnews.com/bc9f37e67745c046563234d1d2e3fe01; Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Speech 
at Council on Investments for the Future (Mar. 5, 2020), https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/ac-
tions/202003/_00009.html [https://perma.cc/LW2K-5HG8]; EU Trade Chief Urges for More Diverse Supply 
Chains After Crisis, U.S.NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:15 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/arti-
cles/2020-04-16/eu-trade-chief-urges-for-more-diverse-supply-chains-after-crisis; Vasileios Theodeosopoulos, 
The Geopolitics of Supply: Towards a New EU Approach to the Security of Supply of Critical Raw Materials?, 
in INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES POLICY BRIEF (2020). 
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(automobiles, hygiene products) closer to (Japanese) consumers, but only with mixed suc-
cess.
254
 Some governments, including the Trump administration,
255
 have rolled out plans 
to “re-shore” industry.
256
 The arguments for re-shoring range from nationalism to regain-
ing control over the production process, to evading unfavorable loss of control over legis-
lative frames and production standards, given that the internet has made production work-
ing conditions around the world transparent, which has in some cases resulted in consumer 
boycotts. From the individual firm’s perspective, proximity to consumers can sometimes 
provide a competitive edge (as was the case for the fashion empire Zara, which hoped to 
beat competitors by rolling out new trends and designs quicker) if production can be un-
ethical and consumers can link production to a product and/or brand.
257
 In addition, coun-
tries are increasingly seeking to establish domestic ownership and control of multinational 
firms, especially when foreign ownership has national security implications.
258
 
Re-shoring may be possible in some industries but not in others. While traditional 
industries have re-shored, the internet and big data transfer have become truly international 
and global, with a large hegemony towards a few corporations and countries holding the 
power on big data mining and internet connectivity.
259
 The United States but also Nordic 
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globalize, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 24, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/24/how-to-deglobalize 
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countries lead the transition to this new economy.
260
 
Another concern with foreign ownership of domestic industry is the potential effect 
on employment.
261
 While such effects do not necessarily have to be negative, one concern 
could be that a foreign owner will act differently during an economic downturn. Often large 
multinational firms are less integrated into and less dependent on domestic political and 
social networks. Such foreign owners may be less susceptible to local political and eco-
nomic pressure than, for example, a traditional family or domestic corporate controlling 
shareholder. 
In addition, in recent years a number of powers, most prominently the People’s Re-
public of China, have arguably begun to use investment in other countries, including finan-
cial interests in firms, for the purpose of advancing their political influence.
262
 While West-
ern buyers in M&A transactions typically have economic goals, for Chinese buyers these 
are frequently mixed with political strategy, including the acquisition of technologies.
263
 
Western jurisdictions, as well as those countries that heeded the advice of international 
organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF,
264
 have opened up themselves for inter-
national investment and are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to such influence. 
COVID-19 has strengthened economic nationalism
265
 and amplified concerns, espe-
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cially in the eye of financial liquidity constraints in the real economy caused by the eco-
nomic fallout of lockdowns. Considerable ownership of domestic firms by Chinese or Rus-
sian owners with dominant state influence, or even the sovereign wealth fund of a wealthy 
OPEC member country, all of a sudden appeared to add “cultural volatility,” which bla-
tantly would not be in the best long-run interests of the investee country.
266
 The goal here 
will often be to ensure a within-country distribution of goods and resources that may be at 
risk if key actors in firms do not prioritize the national “public interest.” Governments will 
want to ensure that profit-oriented decisions by shareholders do not put these at risk. This 
is of course not a new concern but can be traced back at least to Walther Rathenau’s 1917 
argument that shareholders could not be allowed to vote to dissolve a bank that was not 
particularly profitable but of key importance to the German national economy.
267
 
One area where we already see changes is governmental control of FDI. In the United 
States, a 2018 act
268
 strengthened and expanded the scope of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States’ (CFIUS) review of FDI, in particular, to include non-
passive, but non-controlling interests.
269
 Likewise, the EU passed a new regulation on the 
topic in 2019, which came into force in October 2020.
270
 Crucially, Member States must 
inform each other and the EU Commission of direct investment from outside the EU (even 
certain investments that do not undergo screening under national law), and they may launch 
objections in proceedings in each other Member States.
271
 The policy reason is that non-
EU investment in one Member State can have an impact on the economies of other Member 
States.
272
 As was the case in the United States with the expansion of the CFIUS process in 
recent years, the creation was motivated by increasing investment from China (which itself 
is comparatively closed to foreign investment or intervention).
273
 In light of COVID-19, 
Member States have expanded screening requirements and are paying particular attention 
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to the healthcare sector.
274
 Likewise, on the verge of leaving the EU’s common market, 




Given that the playing field may not necessarily be level, many articles of faith held 
by analysts of corporate law and governance during the past decades are increasingly being 
called into question. Outright government ownership may not be a good option under many 
circumstances. Generally speaking, state ownership has had a bad name among scholars of 
corporate finance and corporate governance during the past decades, for various reasons.
276
 
First, the government is usually not motivated by profit, which often results in inefficien-
cies and lacking incentives to monitor management.
277
 This is an issue most of all when 
the firm is publicly traded and there are other shareholders besides the government. In the 
“mixed economy,” minority shareholders often have to reckon with an overpowering con-
trolling shareholder against whom legal recourse will often be difficult.
278
 Second, the 
government as a shareholder often has an impact on the political economy of corporate 
lawmaking, e.g., by a tendency to favor controlling shareholders in lawmaking.
279
 In recent 
years, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where the government holds a controlling stake in 
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a publicly-traded firm, are again on the rise around the world.
280
 
While many Western countries retreated from government ownership since the 1980s, 
some jurisdictions, such as China or Singapore (and Western countries during an earlier 
period), have grown their economy by using it as a strategic tool to prop up firms as na-
tional champions before exposing them to competition.
281
 With the 2008–09 financial cri-
sis, government ownership returned to a certain extent, even in the United States, where 
the government-held stakes in firms that had been bailed out temporarily. Pressure to bail 
out companies will likely return with COVID-19, for example in the aviation industry. Like 
banks, airlines provide key infrastructure to the broader economy, as the presence of a hub 
in a city makes it more attractive as a location for international or regional corporate head-
quarters. The United States CARES Act of 2020 permits and, in certain cases, requires the 
government to take equity interests or warrants when bailing out certain corporations, es-
pecially in the airline industry and business critical to national security.
282
 Independently 
from COVID-19, Attorney General William Barr suggested that the U.S. government could 
buy a stake in Nokia or Ericsson to counter Huawei in the ongoing struggle for the 5G 
mobile network market.
283
 In many other countries, we will likely see a return of govern-
ment ownership and control, for better and for worse. The COVID-19 crisis has already 




 to initiate at least temporary gov-
ernment control of certain firms, in part to save them, in part to secure the preservation of 
a key industry.
286
 EU competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager has urged EU Mem-
ber States to obtain stakes in ailing firms to prevent them from being taken over by Chinese 
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Alan M. Taylor eds., 2013); Baldwin, supra note 138, at 24 (both noting that before globalization of supply chains, 
countries would have to industrialize to become competitive, while afterwards they could benefit by joining a 
supply chain); see also Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 276, at 518–29 (discussing Singapore’s and China’s 
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Champions’, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 617, 617 (2010) (exploring the business success of China’s national cham-
pions). 
 282.  Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003(d) (2020). 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/business/dealbook/bill-barr-huawei-nokia-ericsson.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q6NM-HQ4P]. 
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15, 2020, 3:16 PM), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2020/06/15/argentina-attempts-to-nationalize-
grains-processor-during-covid-19/?slreturn=20200709230456 [https://perma.cc/2DDT-GG7A]. 
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rivals during the pandemic.
287
 The EU countries as well as the United Kingdom are at least 
considering the option of nationalization in order to save ailing companies.
288
 Law firms 




There are other, less intrusive means for the government to pursue specific policies 
with firms, including to avoid foreign influence in firms. Most prominently, many coun-
tries have often employed so-called “Golden Shares” in privatized companies, in which the 
government had key rights to influence corporate policies, or at least veto rights, as long 
as they held a specific minority of shares. Regardless of whether these instruments were 
enshrined in law or corporate charter, in a large number of decisions during the late 1990s 
and 2000s, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held almost all “Golden 
Shares” to be a violation of the free movement of capital because they were liable to dis-
courage cross-border investment.
290
 In one case, Commission v. Belgium,
291
 the provision 
was upheld, as the court found that “the objective pursued by the legislation at issue, 
namely the safeguarding of energy supplies in the event of a crisis, falls undeniably within 




While the court’s jurisprudence is not likely to change as a matter of principle, one 
could imagine that countries will try to find new designs for such instruments to work 
around the case law. Moreover, with the COVID-19 crisis and increasing debates about 
problems of international investment, the argument supporting the qualification of a par-
ticular instrument—as justified in the public interest in the context of the court’s propor-
tionality test—may shift to a certain extent in favor of governments seeking to preserve a 
national influence on key industries. Operating under changed circumstances, the CJEU 
may become more amenable to national influence than it was a generation ago. Countries 
outside the European Union are, of course, not subject to the constraints imposed by Euro-
pean treaties and may therefore employ Golden Shares quite freely. 
An example of legislative development in this area is the Italian “Golden Power” law 
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 290.  E.g., Comm’n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. C-483/99; Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. C-503/99; Comm’n 
v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. C-367/98 (finding that “Golden Shares” violate principles of free movement of capital); 
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ing that the Volkswagen Act of 1960 violated the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). See, e.g., 
Wolf-Georg Ringe, Company Law and Free Movement of Capital, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 378–409 (2010) (discuss-
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of 2012, which allows the government to intervene in acquisition in the defense, energy, 
transportation, communication, and high-tech sectors.
293
 Thus, it can block acquisitions, 
veto shareholder resolutions, and impose specific conditions relating, among others, to 
technology and data transfers for national defense and security reasons.
294
 At least until 
the end of the pandemic, the government’s screening powers were extended to cover the 
financial industry, raw materials, and food security, as well as access to sensitive infor-
mation and media. The amendment governs even the acquisition of controlling interests by 
companies from other EU member states.
295
 
Takeover law has also often been employed as an instrument to shield firms from 
unwanted influence, which includes possible foreign takeovers. Besides antitrust ap-
proval,
296
 the key gatekeeper to a takeover is often the company itself, with the key ques-
tion being who decides about the sale of the firm to the bidder. In jurisdictions with con-
centrated ownership, the bidder would typically have to persuade large shareholders to sell. 
Financially motivated shareholders will sell if the price is good (and it will likely include 
a premium over the market price paid to outside investors). However, countries may en-
courage the creation or persistence of a noyaux durs (“hard core”) of shareholders—as 
France has historically done
297
—with non-financial motivations to maintain the firm 
within national control. These could be the government itself, families, or other firms from 
the country that are deeply embedded into the local economic and political network. Argu-
ably, the mandatory bid rule, which many countries around the world have adopted during 
the past twenty years at least in watered-down form, may help to entrench such a struc-
ture.
298
 This rule—which has its origins in the UK and was implemented in art. 5 of the 
EU Takeover Directive
299
—requires that the acquirer of control must offer to pick up the 
minority shareholders’ stock for the best price paid during a particular period prior to the 
acquisition of control.
300
 This will deter bids because an acquirer that succeeds in wedging 
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a member of the noyaux durs out of the coalition would likely be able to cough up the funds 
to purchase a considerably higher percentage of the firm’s shares.
301
 
When a company’s stock is widely held, dispersed investors will likely be inclined to 
accept a tender offer based on price. Thus, the key question is often whether and how 
boards can defend against a hostile bid. Such bids are often highly controversial because 
they pit the interests of financial investors against those of management and workers.
302
 In 
the United States, many states have implemented antitakeover statutes facilitating defenses 
or otherwise inhibiting hostile bids,
303
 and the Delaware courts scrutinize the board’s ac-
tions relatively lightly with the Unocal test.
304
 Thus, one could already characterize the 
U.S. takeover policy as potentially nationalistic. Reportedly, the pandemic has already re-
sulted in an increasing number of poison pill adoptions by corporate boards.
305
 
By contrast, many other jurisdictions have transplanted the United Kingdom’s passiv-
ity (or neutrality) rule, which prohibits most effective defensive actions.
306
 The EU Take-
over Directive made the neutrality rule optional, and a number of major countries, includ-
ing Germany, did not implement it as such.
307
 Arguably, Continental European countries 
that did introduce it typically did not have more than a handful of firms with dispersed 
ownership, thus making the rule irrelevant in practice.
308
 Nevertheless, the concern of 
firms being taken over by overseas competitors after the financial crisis led a number of 
countries to abandon the mandatory board neutrality rule.
309
 France adopted the neutrality 
rule, but also implemented the reciprocity exception permitted by the Directive, which al-
lows firms not to apply neutrality when faced with a bidder not subject to neutrality itself; 
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(8th ed. 2006), https://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=7Nov2019 
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shareholder consent once a bona fide bid has materialized). 
 307.  Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and 
Europe, 42 CORNELL J. INT’L L. 301, 321–23 (2009) (discussing the German implementation). An EU report of 
2013 found that Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Poland did not im-
plement the (optional) passivity rule. EU COMM’N, THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE ASSESSMENT REPORT 64–
66 (2013); see also Paul Davies et al., The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?, in COMPANY LAW AND 
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM, supra note 250, at 105, 135–38 (surveying transposition choices). 
 308.  Ferrarini & Miller, supra note 307, at 331. But see Davies et al., supra note 307, at 121–22 (surveying 
transportation choices). 
 309.  Davies et al., supra note 307, at 142 (discussing Italy and Hungary). 
2021 COVID-19 and Comparative Corporate Governance 605 
 
in addition, the law made defense warrants available to firms,
310
 which bear some resem-
blance to the U.S. poison pill and potentially function as a takeover defense.
311
 
Many countries also allow for “structural” takeover defenses that are put into place 
not ex post in reaction to a bid, but ex ante in anticipation of possible bids. France’s famous 
“Florange” law of 2014 made so-called loyalty shares, where long-term stockholders have 
additional voting rights, the default for all publicly traded firms.
312
 The law was introduced 
in reaction to the closure of a France plant of Arcelor, a former French “national champion” 
that had been acquired by the Indian conglomerate Mittal.
313
 The protectionist motivation 
is obvious in this case. 
Takeover law is often dominated by interests that are salient to politicians in the ju-
risdiction in question. Management and labor will favor takeover defenses, while outside 
investors will oppose it. Thus, the political economy will only weigh in favor of hostile 
bids where institutional investors are a powerful interest group, such as in the United King-
dom
314
 (outside of jurisdictions where the rule does not matter because of concentrated 
ownership). Following up on the trend of recent years, with COVID-19 we are likely to see 
more movement toward an anti-takeover position, especially where changes favor domes-
tic interest groups. 
First, we may see additional countries edging away from the neutrality rule and per-
mitting takeover defenses. Early in the pandemic, the depressed stock market raised the 
concern that foreign bidders could acquire European firms, among others, at bargain 
prices.
315
 This concern has not entirely abated, even in the United States, as some firms are 
still suffering from depressed stock prices.
316
 In the long run, management and unions will 
continue to clamor for the preservation of jobs. In addition, the argument of the necessity 
to keep key industries within national control may make more countries abandon the pas-
sivity rule in favor of strengthening takeover defenses. Second, regulators will be tempted 
to permit deviations from the mandatory bid rule, for example, to orchestrate a domestic 
bailout of a financially distressed company.
317
 
Finally, a number of non-corporate supranational anti-protectionist policies are also 
likely to come under renewed scrutiny. In the EU, two key areas of law seek to establish a 
level playing field. First, state aid law restricts national subsidies to narrow circum-
stances.
318
 The policy is intended to prevent Member States from interfering with market 
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operations by selecting winners and from competing with each other on subsidies.
319
 The 
Treaty exempts “aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences,”
320
 and the EU Commission has already determined that COVID-19 falls un-
der this provision. For example, Member States are aiding flagship carriers, likely to the 
detriment of other airlines.
321
 The United Kingdom’s desire to leave the EU’s state aid 
regime after the 2020 transition period in order to subsidize companies was one of the most 
contentious issues in the Brexit negotiations.
322
 
Second, EU public procurement law sets up procedural requirements binding the 
Member States and prohibiting preferences for domestic bidders.
323
 The Commission has 
issued guidance stating, among other things, that public buyers could use an emergency 
procedure to negotiate directly with a contractor and avoid publication.
324
 Inside and out-
side the EU, the temptation has risen for politicians to award public contracts without a 
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transparent tender procedure, often to meet emergency demands.
325
 In countries outside 
the EU, these similar requirements are much less of a hurdle, but we are likely to see pres-
sure to alleviate these strict requirements within Europe, to the disfavor of firms—both 
from inside and outside the common market. 
C. The Return of “Stakeholderism” 
The third area where we are likely to see change is the principle of “shareholder pri-
macy” as such. During the past few decades up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, a share-
holder wealth orientation had been on the ascendancy, whereas stakeholder models were 
typically considered inefficient aberrations by mainstream corporate law theory, most of 
all in the United States. As discussed above, the creeping abandonment of shareholder pri-
macy began in the early 2010s.
326
 The trend reached a high point with the August 2019 
statement by the Business Roundtable in the United States, which argues that corporations 
should work for the benefit of all stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers, 
communities, and shareholders.
327
 The American Law Institute, under the leadership of 
Professor Edward Rock, is currently pursuing a project to draft a Restatement of Corporate 
Governance,
328
 which will at least investigate a pluralist conception of corporate law.
329
 
A growing number of firms have begun to include ESG criteria (Environmental, Social, 
Governance) in executive compensation.
330
 
In addition to changes in the interaction between capital and labor outlined in Section 
IV.A.3 above, we argue that there are two current aspects of public policy in corporate law 
that are closely related to COVID-19. Section IV.C.1 discusses the growing debate about 
inequality, and how it affects business. Section IV.C.2 addresses the impact of climate 
change and growing pressures for companies to improve their environmental practices. 
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Section IV.C.3 argues that corporate governance will have to consider stakeholder issues 
to preserve its public legitimacy. 
1. Inequality 
Historically, crises have always been drivers of socio-political change.
331
 The 
COVID-19 pandemic in particular has sparked social criticism and protests around the 
world against the existing status quo.
332
 Building on already rising trends, strict COVID-
19 curfews in all major economies had the side effect of mobilizing the population against 
injustice and inequality around the world.
333
 In the wake or aftermath of strict lockdowns 
all over the world, protests arose against state interference in the privacy and freedom of 
individuals, but also against social inequality and for promoting climate justice. Online 
communities had fierce debates about long-held wishes for a fairer, more equal, just, and 
sustainable world. 
COVID-19 has exacerbated inequality, if considering the current divide between win-
ning and losing industries or the rising gap between financial markets and the real econ-
omy, which has also drawn public attention lately. Concerns about growing inequality have 
increasingly been discussed since the 2008–09 world financial recession, which was par-
ticularly hard on minorities.
334
 Already now we can detect that the impetus of the novel 
coronavirus hits the poor and vulnerable, including low-skilled workers and refugees, un-
equally hard when it comes to infection rates, seriously-critical symptoms and unfavorable 
disease trajectories, economic fall-outs in declined income, furloughs or job insecurity, 
and/or degraded lifestyles due to the lack of personal space, mobility, connectivity, and 
quality of life.
335
 Both the human and financial cost appear to fall more heavily on those 
disfavored in the economic system already.
336
 
In addition, the pandemic initially had a considerable impact on the stock market, 
which raises concerns in places where employees saw their invested retirement wealth 
eviscerated, such as the United States. While the market caught up to its previous levels by 
the late summer of 2020 and rose to all-time highs during the final quarter of 2020, a lot of 
 
 331.  See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007) (ana-
lyzing how crises lead to change). 
 332.  E.g., The Year When Everything Changed, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 2020), https://www.econo-
mist.com/leaders/2020/12/19/the-year-when-everything-changed [https://perma.cc/C7ZE-YNTQ] (“[T]he pan-
demic has highlighted injustice.”).  
 333.  Raj Chetty et al., Income Segregation and Intergenerational Mobility Across Colleges in the United 
States, 135 Q.J. ECON. 1567, 1567–633 (2020); See generally BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A 
NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2016); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). On trends during the pandemic, see Raj Chetty & Markus Brun-
nermeier, Raj Chetty on the Economic Impacts of COVID-19: Real-Time Evidence from Private Sector Data, 
PRINCETON UNIV. BENDHEIM CTR. FOR FIN. (June 17, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://bcf.princeton.edu/events/raj-
chetty-on-the-economic-impacts-of-covid-19-real-time-evidence-from-private-sector-data/. 
 334.  See generally ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 
(2020) (examining the effects of recessions and economic fallouts on minorities).  
 335.  Martina Björkman Nyqvist et al., COVID-19 Amplifies Inequality: Fight Back with Long-Term Think-
ing, WORLD ECON. F. (July 15, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/covid-19-amplifies-inequality-
fight-back-with-long-term-thinking/ [https://perma.cc/GDU7-YDDY]. 
 336.  Papadopoulos et al., supra note 74. 
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uncertainty remains. This adds to the fact that many 401(k) plans contain woefully inade-
quate amounts of savings.
337
 The market impact of COVID-19, as well as the fact that 
many will withdraw money from pension plans early after the disruption of their liveli-
hood,
338
 will likely mean that the percentage of workers with inadequate retirement savings 
will increase; minorities may be disproportionately negatively affected in the long-run, 
while their savings dissipate in expected inflation and negative interest rate climates.
339
 




Policymakers will therefore feel pressure to support the middle-class—likely in their 
role as workers with specific skillsets rather than as “forced capitalists” holding stock in 
anticipation of retirement.
341
 One proposal in the corporate governance area is to put 
worker representatives on boards. Many European countries, most prominently Germany, 
have had employee representation of codetermination systems for decades.
342
 While their 
economic effects are frequently studied and much disputed—benefits for human capital 
development are discussed but disputed
343
—it is intuitive that workers on the board can 




In this vein, employee representation on the board of directors, which had long been 
on the defense in corporate law policy debates, seems to be making gains again. Most 
prominently, France expanded its employee representation requirement (which was previ-
ously limited to certain public sector and privatized firms) in June 2013 in some private 
firms, and further extended it in 2015 to those firms with one thousand employees in France 
or five thousand employees worldwide.
345
 Even in English-speaking countries, board-level 
 
 337.  E.g., TERESA GHILARDUCCI & TONY JAMES, RESCUING RETIREMENT: A PLAN TO GUARANTEE 
RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR ALL AMERICANS 3, 31–36 (2020); Brian Anderson, Index Reveals Americans’ 
Heightened Worries Around Retirement, 401K SPECIALIST MAG., (July 21, 2020), https://401kspecialist-
mag.com/index-reveals-americans-heightened-worries-around-retirement [https://perma.cc/ECE8-YL27]. 
 338.  In addition, the CARES Act, § 2202 permits early distributions from retirement plans without a tax 
penalty under certain circumstances. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) Act of 2020, 
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https://www.epi.org/publication/the-state-of-american-retirement-savings [https://perma.cc/BZL5-CRJ7] (noting 
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 340.  See Gelter, supra note 88, at 949 (discussing the political preferences for shareholder primacy of U.S. 
voters). 
 341.  See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 
4 (2007) (describing beneficiaries of retirement plans as “forced capitalists”); Gelter, supra note 88, at 936–46 
(discussing the tradeoff between workers’ interest qua workers and as investors saving for retirement). 
 342.  On the history of German codetermination, see Pistor, supra note 93, at 165–77. 
 343.  Supra notes 226–229 and accompanying text. 
 344.  E.g., John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel, Worker Directors: A German Product That Did Not Export?, 
50 INDUS. REL. 354, 359 (2011) (discussing rent-seeking by labor as a motivation for codetermination). 
 345.  The threshold amounts were initially higher but reduced to the current amounts in 2015. See Code de 
commerce [C. com.] [Commercial Code] art. L225-27-1. For a recent overview of employee representation re-
quirements, see Michael Gold & Jeremy Waddington, Introduction: Board-Level Employee Representation in 
Europe: State of Play, 25 EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 205 (2019); Christophe Clerc, La codétermination: un modèle eu-
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employee representation has become part of the political debate. In the United Kingdom, 
Prime Minister Theresa May brought up the idea after taking over leadership of the gov-
ernment after the 2016 Brexit vote.
346
 In the United States, Senator Elizabeth Warren put 
forward a bill in 2018,
347
 and Bernard Sanders made it part of his presidential campaign 
platform.
348
 On the international scale, it has been pointed out that income inequality and 
employee codetermination are negatively correlated.
349
 Even if the U.K. and U.S. pro-
posals have led to tangible political outcomes, dissatisfaction with economic inequality 
further fueled by COVID-19 will likely increase the pressure to change. 
This is not to say that this will necessarily have either efficient or inefficient results. 
It is also not clear that such systems would actually result in less inequality in the United 
States, especially during times of financial constraints. As we already discussed, it seems 
more plausible that they will create two classes of workers—“ins” and “outs”—where only 
the former hold jobs that give them some influence on the corporate level.
350
 This is true 
particularly in times of digitally-induced disruption of many industries. In any event, the 
key point here is that we are more likely to see it in terms of the political economy of 
corporate governance. The reason is going to be its effects on the public perception (“we 
are doing something for the middle class”) rather than its actual benefits. 
An even more difficult question is whether corporate law and governance can be used 
to address inequality in the more traditional sense, i.e., the growing gap between the rich 
and the poor, and economic pressures on the middle class. Many corporate law analysts 
believe that the recent switch toward “stakeholder governance” in the Business Roundtable 
statement is intended mainly to serve the interest of management by insulating it from 
shareholder pressure.
351
 In this view, if corporate law wholly absorbed this vision, it is 
unlikely that employees would benefit. The classic invective against stakeholder orienta-
tion is that managers will be less accountable because they will have a higher degree of 
discretion compared to a situation where they are required to maximize shareholder 
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federal incorporation, which would come with employee representation on the board). 
 348.  Corporate Accountability and Democracy, BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-ac-
countability-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/TPL9-B95R]; see, e.g., Gregory Krieg & Ryan Nobles, Bernie 
Sanders Wants to Give Workers an Ownership Stakes in Big Companies, CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 14, 2019, 6:00 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/14/politics/bernie-sanders-worker-ownership-plan/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/R5XU-MDMJ]. 
 349.  April Hall, Employee as Director, DIRS. & BDS. 40, 42 (2019) (graphically showing a negative correla-
tion between stronger forms of employee representation and the Gini coefficient). However, one could argue that 
there may be other factors that likely explain both variables (endogeneity). 
 350.  Supra Section IV.A.3.ii. 
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 Managers and boards are likely to follow the money and maximize those inter-
ests from which they benefit most. Executive compensation—which is oriented toward 
stock price—will continue to play a role, as will the managerial labor market and the mar-
ket for corporate control.
353
 
International experience supports the concern that a mere shift in what the law states 
to be the “corporate purpose” or “corporate objective” will change little. For example, U.K. 
law today follows an “enlightened shareholder primacy” vision since the Companies Act 
2006.
354
 Thus, while a director “must act in the way [s]he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole,” they must have regard to the interests of employees and certain other stakeholders 
in this context.
355
 While under this statute stakeholder interests are only instrumental for 
shareholder interests, this was not as unequivocal between 1980 and 2006 when the law 
required managers “to have regard to the interest of employees” without clarifying that 
shareholder interests were supreme.
356
 The provision was widely acknowledged to be ir-
relevant because employees were not given tools to enforce it,
357
 while U.K. takeover law 
set strong incentives in favor of management.
358
 
Similarly, the current Indian law requires firms to pursue the interests of stakehold-
ers
359
 and is subject to a similar criticism because there is no effective enforcement mech-
anism.
360
 Continental European countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy, have long 
had debates—which were to some extent reflected in the case law—about whether direc-
tors and managers should have an obligation to pursue the “interests of shareholders” or 
pursue a “pluralist” corporate objective that would incorporate a larger set of stakeholders 
into the “interests of the enterprise” or “interest of the association.”
361
 All of these suffer 
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from the same challenge, namely the difficulty of defining specific duties in the absence of 
a clear metric.
362
 France, since the 2019 PACTE law, explicitly states business associations 
are run in the company interest (intérêt social), taking into account the social and environ-
mental aspects of its activities.
363




Other legal instruments that shift bargaining power to labor, such as German codeter-
mination or labor codes that empower unions more than in the United States, are typically 
much more significant. Disclosure requirements seem to have a greater impact in practice. 
For example, the U.K. Companies Act of 2006 bundled its “enlightened shareholder pri-
macy principle” with a requirement to disclose the firm’s activities across environmental, 
employment, social, community, and human rights issues.
365
 Similarly, the EU Accounting 
Directive now includes a requirement for non-financial disclosures relating to “environ-
mental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery 
matters.”
366
 With a legal compliance requirement such as these, publicly traded corpora-
tions and their legal counsel are becoming more attentive to corporate social responsibility 
issues. Overall, however, it is not a wild guess to say that firms will continue to experience 
pressure to foster the interests of a wide set of stakeholders. As Gatti and Ondersma have 
recently pointed out, in the United States that would likely gain political capital in the 
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 It is less clear whether and how much workers or other stakeholders will bene-
fit. 
Besides the traditional struggle between “capital” and the working middle classes, 
public debates are increasingly concerned about different forms of inequality, namely be-
tween genders as well as ethnic groups. In its entirety, the coronavirus crisis as an acceler-
ator of trends and driver of inequality will likely bring long-term effects on social attention 
to ethnic minority groups.
368
 At least in the United States, but potentially also in some 
other jurisdictions, these social developments will also rub off on corporate goals and gen-
eral social values. Nowadays, entrepreneurial culture sees an increase in stakeholder focus 
on resolving economic inequalities. A call for alignment of entrepreneurial activities with 
the pursuit of social justice and the achievement of climate change goals is particularly 
widespread in public protests and online discussions. 
Contemporary social media plays a unique and unprecedented role as an instant ac-
celerator of trends that are easily accessible and can be followed by all social groups. Social 
media online forums encourage transparency and perpetuate group dynamics that can 
quickly ignite and evoke general trends around the world. These trends are now putting 
enormous pressure on companies, public institutions, as well as individuals and politicians. 
Corporations are sometimes seen as quasi-political institutions. Together with public insti-
tutions, the corporate world is also devoted to higher social goals—such as democracy, 
social equality, and environmental coordination.
369
 Entrepreneurs and politicians are in-
creasingly under pressure to consider these diverse tendencies with their actions and 
measures. It is conceivable for entrepreneurial disruptions to arise, in which pressure from 
competitive markets and critical political levels will turn the ability to react flexibly and 
sensitively to different trends in society into a competitive advantage.
370
 Those firms that 
can act quickly and flexibly with empathy for others and sensitivity for crowds but also 
skills to use information and online communication wisely may then be more likely to 
survive. 
During the past decade, a more tangible force for change on social issues has emerged 
in the form of the use of shareholder power to improve corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), which can be defined as the inclusion of environmental, social, and governance 
issues (ESG) into corporate decision-making.
371
 In some cases, policymakers attempted to 
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use increased shareholder powers—especially regarding runaway executive compensa-
tion—partly to reduce inequality.
372
 The larger social effects of such instruments are lim-
ited in that they do not reduce economic inequality between workers with well-paying cor-
porate jobs and those who do not. This tends to match the distinction between those with 
and without significant savings invested in the stock market. In recent years, the use of 
shareholder powers for social purposes is closely linked to the activities of institutional 
investors, most of all the “Big 3” fund management advisors (BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
State Street) to use their influence for social change.
373
 One area is gender diversity on the 
board, where the Big 3 have pushed for increased female representation on the board during 
the past years.
374
 BlackRock has recently affirmed its commitment to stakeholders affected 
by COVID-19 as well as racial equity and environmental justice.
375
 Environmental issues 
and climate change, which we discuss below, have been a particular focus of institutional 
activism. 
2. Climate Change, Institutional Shareholder Stewardship, and Other Public Policy 
Goals 
The second trend that has had a widespread impact on the corporate world in recent 
years is attention to climate change. Global warming accounts for one of the most pressing 
contemporary problems of humankind as for exacerbating more complex and unprece-
dented environmental risks than ever before.
376
 As never before in history since the birth 
of the earth and modern productivity, environmental sensitivity to economic growth and 
corporate activities challenge modern democracy and economic development.
377
 
There are top-down approaches to combating the climate crisis. For instance, the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) advocates for economic growth within 
the framework of sustainability. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
research and United Nations Conferences of the Parties (COP) have generated substantive 
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literature on global climate change negotiations that stresses the currently most urgent need 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation around the world. Since 2015, the Sustainable 
Development Goals encouraged countries to create jobs in green industries in order to boost 
the world economy and curb climate change at the same time.
378
 In 2019, over 600 corpo-
rations signed a letter to the United States Congress advocating for the reduction of green-
house gas emissions in support of climate attention.
379
 The signing entities pledged to 
move away from fossil fuel extraction and subsidies in order to transition to renewable 
energy, expand public transport, and reduce overall emissions. 
Since 2019, Senator Edward Markey and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 
have advocated for the United States to transition to the exclusive use of renewable energy 
and new transportation technologies such as electric cars and high-speed rail systems as an 
extension of Obama administration plans.
380
 The so-called Green New Deal (GND) aims 
at lifting up vulnerable communities via state-sponsored employment, universal health 
care, increased minimum wages, and preventing monopolies. The historical New Deal was 
a bonds financing strategy of the Roosevelt administration in the United States between 
1932 and 1939.
381
 In total, around fifteen to thirty-five billion USD were spent on a series 
of development programs that funded public work projects, financial reform, and regula-
tion efforts on economic development.
382
 The idea of a GND now captures a ten-year na-
tional mobilization via work security and working conditions by high-quality health care, 
affordable housing, economic security, access to clean water, air, healthy food and nature, 
education, clean, renewable, zero-emission energy, repairing of infrastructure, energy ef-
ficient smart power grids, upgraded living conditions, pollution elimination, clean manu-
facturing, and positive work collaborations. 
The Biden-Harris Administration promoted an economic transition in line with sus-
tainability goals throughout their election campaign.
383
 The proposed GND economic plan 
advocates using a carbon tax and green bonds in order to stimulate economic growth. Based 
on the foundations of Modern Monetary Theory, the GND aims to vitalize the economy 
through a transition to renewable energy and sustainable growth.
384
 The GND serves as a 
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market solution to implement global environmental governance as “the sum of the many 
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.”
385 
The GND thereby combines former U.S. President Roosevelt’s economic approach with 
modern ideas such as renewable energy and resource efficiency. Various proposals for a 
GND have been made internationally, for instance in Australia, Canada, and Europe. Since 




Whether and how these Green Deals will be implemented is yet to be determined. 
Policymakers will likely use different instruments, including Global Environmental Gov-
ernance (such as formal legal treaties, global conferences but also intergovernmental pan-
els),
387
 fiscal space (creating revenues via carbon tax),
388
 monetary and credit policies (in-
cluding insurances),
389







 environmental pricing reform,
393
 absorbing CO2 and 
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 sustainable tourism that mitigates the negative im-
pact on the environment and society, as well as engaging financial markets and portfolio 
managers. 
Bottom-up efforts to face the climate challenge have changed as well since the novel 
coronavirus crisis has started. The COVID-19 lockdowns have fueled widespread anger, 
with social masses protesting physically and online around the world. This has further in-
creased pressure on corporations to adopt socially conscientious goals, among which care 
for climate justice is one of the most blatantly argued. Protestors have called on corporate 
boards to make economic sacrifices today for future generations by shifting corporate con-
duct to a more environmentally-friendly way and cutting on carbon emissions to avert 
global warming.
396
 While climate change mitigation will likely come at the expense of a 
transition period to clean energy, many scientists argue that it is justified given a shrinking 
time window prior to reaching tipping points that lock the world in a trajectory of changing 
temperature irreversibly.
397
 Sustainable financing strategies to fund climate stabilizing pol-
icies and pro-environmental action are at present currently being developed. 
In recent decades, environmentalism has already become a subject of corporate en-
deavors openly intended to serve the community.
398
 In addition, firms have increasingly 
begun to cater to shareholder interests professing to aim at long-term stability and wide-
spread societal acceptance of pro-social corporate governance. First, CSR codes of conduct 
integrated social responsibility practices into what was considered to be state-of-the-art 
financial investment practices.
399
 The finance community concurrently started paying at-
tention to ethical considerations of the asset-issuing entities.
400
 Empirical research found 
that corporate social engagement was associated with corporate financial performance and 
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The financial social responsibility movement foremost came to life in Socially Re-
sponsible Investments (SRI), which integrate social, ethical, and environmental concerns 
into portfolio choices and financial management. SRIs are based on socio-psychological 
motives of ethical investment.
402
 Thereby conscientious investors pursue economic and 
social value maximization alike in social screenings, shareholder advocacy, and commu-
nity investing.
403
 Socially conscientious market choices are based on positive and negative 
screenings, including economic fundamentals as well as qualitative intra- (e.g., corporate 
policies and practices, employee relations) and extra-organizational (e.g., externalities on 
current and future constituents) corporate social conduct.
404
 Positive screenings favor cor-
porations with sound social and environmental records that pay attention to human rights 
and labor standards, equal opportunities, environmental protection, consumer safety, com-
munity concerns, and stakeholder relations. Negative screenings exclude corporations that 
contribute to socially irresponsible activities such as addictive products and services (e.g., 
liquor, tobacco, gambling), defense (e.g., weapons, firearms, landmines), environmentally 
hazardous production (e.g., pollution, nuclear power) and humanitarian deficiencies (e.g., 
discrimination, human rights violations) or activities labelled as “politically incorrect.” 
Post-hoc negative screenings lead to the removal of investment capital from portfolios to 
attribute global governance goals.
405
 Political divestiture is a negative-screening-based 
strategy of removing stocks from a portfolio to screen out socially irresponsible corpora-
tions based on social, ethical and religious objections.
406
 Pressure of this type thereby in-
duces shareholders to divest from certain markets with the goal of accomplishing socio-
political change for political and social reasons.
407
 Socially responsible investors thus use 
their market power to put pressure on governments stirring war and social conflict, sup-
porting terrorism and engaging in human rights violations.
408
 
How COVID-19 will affect these trends of environmental concerns entering the cor-
porate and finance world is not yet entirely clear. It is plausible that the pandemic will 
change the way individuals consume in line with a more environmentally conscientious 
lifestyle aiding sustainability. COVID-19 has triggered attention to a healthy and consump-
tion-conscientious way of living. This also goes hand-in-hand with sustainability pledges 
as green food choices often meet the criteria of ecological and CO2-friendly production. 
COVID-19 increased the call for firms and institutional investors to pay attention to healthy 
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lifestyles that foster prevention and help reduce the spread of the pandemic.
409
 Corpora-
tions may also have to give in to stakeholder pressures advocating for corporations to serve 
the greater good and wider stakeholder community. SRI and carbon divestiture are effec-
tive corporate strategies against the backdrop of a warming globe. Corporations that opt 
for early withdrawal may enjoy a first-mover advantage that also signals proactive ethical 
leadership in an already ongoing transition to renewable energy. In addition, such firms 
may qualify to issue climate bonds, thus reducing firms’ costs of capital allowing them to 
use SRI as a strategic, entrepreneurial move.
410
 Further, corporations remaining in carbon-
intensive unstable markets may suffer long-term losses in the wake of an overall economic 
market decline in carbon industries and may be exposed to future litigation risks for envi-
ronmental damages that could be avoided by fossil fuel divestiture. 
After COVID-19, additional organized pressure on corporations to move against cli-
mate change is likely to come from two sources, namely governments and institutional 
investors. First, in the wake of the crisis, the economy in many capitalist countries has 
become more governmentally planned during the epidemic. Governments around the globe 
have ordered the shutdown of some industries and have directed others to mass-produce 
urgently needed supplies such as masks or ventilators. There are often good reasons to 
deviate from a pure market economy in situations of severe crisis. Market disruptions (such 
as wars or other severe demand shocks) often lead to market failures where vigorous com-
petition leads to social harm because key products and services are in short supply, thus 
prompting the government to step in to coordinate distribution.
411
 The pandemic has led to 
political pressure, but also pressure from groups such as customers, investors, and employ-
ees fueled by the lockdowns has intensified already-existing trends pushing corporations 
toward aiding with the resolution of global problems that do not necessarily improve corpo- 
rate profits. Joining the chorus, institutional investors, possibly seeking to address portfo-
lio-wide risks, called upon pharmaceutical firms to cooperate to develop novel antiviral 
treatments and vaccines.
412
 It is not entirely clear that these firms or their investors will 
greatly profit from such treatments, which will have to be mass-produced and delivered 
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quickly to quell the disease.
413
 Nevertheless, competition authorities around the world 
agreed to suspend antitrust enforcement to allow necessary cooperation among competi-
tors.
414
 In September 2020, leading pharmaceutical firms published a joint statement agree-
ing not to file for regulatory authorization of their products until safety has been proven, 
thus curbing competition among each other.
415
 
Politicians will be tempted to retain this “war economy”
416
 to address other issues of 
the day, so they may also turn to regulating the corporate sector on climate change con-
cerns.
417
 Governments may now be more attentive to stakeholder urges and investor re-
sponsibility when using their newfound position as crisis managers and financial aid plan-
ners with extended powers during states of healthcare emergencies and pandemic risks to 
remedy other social ills besides COVID-19, particularly climate change.
418
 Strengthened 
command-and-control powers after COVID-19 may persist beyond the virus crisis. While 
the economic fallout of the coronavirus crisis gets cured by iconic governmental rescue 
packages and bailouts, these extensive aids may be used to implement system change—see 
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The COVID-19 governmental shock therapy may also peg any governmental aid to 
conditionalities that may also allow governments to direct firms to address the climate 
change challenge. Governmental crisis management may also use its regrown authority and 
the corporate dependency on public emergency funds and rescue bail-out packages to set 
incentives to implement environmental degrowth as outlined in the Green New Deal 
(GND).
420
 Corporations dependent on governmental bailout plans and tax cuts may softly 
be forced to adopt and adapt to serving those who fund these rescue packages via their tax. 
As a positive market incentive plan, the government may thereby urge the industry to tran-
sition to a green economy or implement ideas brought forward in the wake of the GND. 
The GND serves as a market solution to implement global environmental and pro-social 
governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs.”
421
 Corporations that are dependent on governmental aid 
will likely be obliged to follow the guidelines of the GND and implement eco-friendly 
recovery solutions. 
The second major source of pressure on corporations will be the finance sector. On a 
broader institutional level, already before COVID-19, institutional investors increasingly 
pushed firms toward more responsible environmental conduct.
422
 A recent political divest-
iture trend has been the disinvestment of fossil fuels to implement climate stabilization by 
shifting to renewable energy sources. Negative screening comes to life in fossil fuel divest-
ments. Fossil fuel divestment pegged to investment in renewable energy is the removal of 
investment assets including stocks, bonds, and investment funds from companies involved 
in extracting fossil fuels, in an attempt to reduce climate change by tackling its ultimate 
causes.
423
 Numerous groups advocate fossil fuel divestment, which in 2015 was reportedly 
the fastest growing divestment movement in history.
424
 Beginning on campuses in the 
United States in 2010 with students urging their administrations to reallocate investments 
from the fossil fuel industry to clean energy and communities most impacted by climate 
change, the movement quickly spread across the globe.
425
 By December 2016, a total of 
688 institutions and over 58,000 individuals representing $5.5 trillion in assets worldwide 
had been divested to move away from fossil fuels-driven economic growth.
426
 
The current COVID-19 crisis characterized by lockdowns and economic consumption 
crunches also bears an opportunity to divest not only on the individual but also on the 
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corporate and financial level in reassessing one’s own personal consumption behavior, re-
setting corporate conduct with cleaner and more environmentally friendly means, and 
steering the finance world into a more sustainable digitalization economic growth focus. 
In terms of significance in the market, fossil fuel has lost ground to “digitalized” corpora-
tions that generate economic growth through the creation of online resources.
427
 This is 
increasingly reflected in the S&P 500 and other financial indices.
428
 COVID-19 will likely 
exacerbate this trend to cleaner and greener economic growth. Adding onto the contempo-
rary urge to find the funds for climate stabilization, COVID-19 could aid in turning around 
individuals’ preferences towards living an individually healthier life with less carbon-in-
tensive consumption. Corporations then would be incentivized to shift away from carbon-
intensive production due to stakeholder pressure. Governmental conditionalities pegged to 
green transitions but also the finance sector finding explicit value in digitalization growth 
and implicit long-term socially inclusive value in SRI are likely to happen in the future. 
Moreover, climate change has at least two implications for the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance. First, it is another area where investors appear to be 
increasingly pursuing public policy goals. The “Big 3” have been engaging in rhetoric to 
push firms to act more responsibly regarding climate change risks.
429
 Recent empirical 
evidence suggests an actual effect, where higher Big 3 ownership is associated with lower 
carbon emission levels.
430
 Firms are thus arguably sacrificing profit-making at the altar of 
public policy without being directly forced by regulation. One explanation why firms may 
act this way is that they are motivated by long-term interests.
431
 With an increasing preva-
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lence of index investment, investors that are diversified across the entire market may ben-
efit financially from long-term environmental conduct because they may seek to minimize 
losses across the entire portfolio as diversified “universal owners.”
432
 
Second, institutional investors may want to cultivate a positive image in the media 
and avoid negative publicity. Fund managers may do this because they believe that it will 
help them to retain their position in the market for investors. Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber 
have recently suggested that index fund operators are now promoting ESG issues to appeal 
to millennial investors. Given that they cannot compete on returns, they need to sell their 
products by creating an identity associated with a set of values appreciated by consum-
ers.
433
 However, given that many investors are primarily interested in financial gain, an-
other motivation may be that fund managers want to avoid being cast as villains in the 
public eye.
434
 Regardless of the reason for the fund manager’s motives, it seems that insti-
tutional investors can no longer eschew the pursuit of public policy goals. 
The pursuit of public policy goals is becoming more evident against the backdrop of 
“stewardship codes” internationally. The first stewardship code was promulgated in the 
United Kingdom in 2010 and was intended to promote institutional investors as guardian 
for the interests of dispersed shareholders.
435
 In recent years, stewardship codes increas-
ingly emphasize ESG issues, which add environmental and social concerns to govern-
ance.
436
 Institutional investors thus increasingly have a mission to pursue “public” 
goals.
437
 This will likely continue with COVID-19. Institutional investors have already 
announced that the pandemic will further induce them to emphasize ESG issues, as it has 
highlighted social inequality and institutional vulnerabilities.
438
 Early empirical evidence 
suggests that investors continued to prefer funds with low ESG risks, as shown by the 
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3. Corporate Governance and the Social Compact 
The discussion of the effects of inequality and climate change reinforces that corpo-
rate law is contingent on the larger social and economic environment. 20th century history 
has shown that crisis-induced reforms and the creation of corporate governance institutions 
often created paths that countries find hard to deviate from later, even if such deviation 
would have been welfare enhancing. As Mark Roe wrote in 2003, “[b]efore a nation can 
produce, it must achieve social peace.”
440
 Both West German codetermination and Japa-
nese lifetime employment developed not to induce human capital investment, but likely 
because political circumstances dictated an arrangement that would quell potential labor 
unrest and shareholder power,
441
 regardless of what the actual effects of these institutions 
are. Thus, historical circumstances during the Great Depression and after World War II set 
the stage for late 20th century corporate governance, including financing patterns and own-
ership structures. 
COVID-19 may or may not turn out to be an important juncture in economic history. 
However, we are already seeing a relative reduction of pro-shareholder institutions, and an 
emphasis on stakeholder and public interests, in part because COVID-19 has highlighted 
frictions in developed economies.
442
 A shareholder primacist might consider stakeholder 
concerns a luxury good to which firms and economies can only pay attention in good times. 
However, because of feedback from the political and social systems to the economic sys-
tem, firms will not be able to ignore them. Because median voter preferences are shifting 
toward concerns about inequality and climate change, legislatures will likely become more 
inclined to incorporate “stakeholder” and “public” concerns into corporate law. Under 
pressure from politics and institutional investors, businesses will need to address societal 
pressures that affect the competitive environment.
443
 
At the very least, it appears that “shareholder” countries—such as the United States 
or the United Kingdom—are slowly edging toward a more pro-employee position and a 
modified corporate purpose, at least in the public discourse.
444
 This is not necessarily be-
cause these positions would be efficient from the internal perspective of the corporate sys-
tem, but because as a part of the larger economic and political system, corporate govern-
ance sometimes must compromise to ensure that it harmonizes with the social compact. To 
preserve its legitimacy corporate law and governance may be forced to adjust. 
V. COVID-19 AND THE EVOLUTION OF COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
We have seen that outside and inside pressures on firms are changing because of 
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COVID-19. Firms will have to become more resilient, both in terms of their financial and 
labor practices; governments may be more likely to conscript firms for their own purposes; 
and pressures to pursue certain public policies will mount, thus pushing firms toward a 
more “stakeholder-oriented” position in the corporate purpose debate. 
Change in corporate governance systems has sometimes been analyzed in terms of 
evolutionary theory, given that the basic elements of evolution apply, namely variation, 
retention of characteristics, and the presence of a selection mechanism.
445
 The classic de-
bate about regulatory competition in the United States could be described as an evolution-
ary account. Regardless of whether one believes that state corporate law is trending toward 
a “race to the top” or “race to the bottom,” the law evolves in a certain direction because 
laws that are selected more frequently survive in the market.
446
 More to the point, the de-
bate about international convergence in corporate governance rests on the survival not just 
of laws, but of firms.
447
 As they are in competition with each other. Firms applying the 
“fittest: corporate law survive because they attract more investment, because they are better 
run, and because they are thus more successful in the product market.
448
 In this context, 
the unit of selection is the firm. 
In principle, the pandemic could have two effects on the population of firms. First, it 
may simply eliminate some firms from the market, and thus reward firms resilient to a one-
time shock with survival. In this case, there may not be much of an evolutionary effect. 
This is because the characteristics of firms are less fixed than those of natural organisms. 
Generally speaking, an evolutionary account of law requires not only the selection, but also 
the retention of evolved characteristics.
449
 However, law evolves in a Lamarckian rather 
than in a Darwinian fashion
450
—meaning that not only inherited, but also acquired char-
acteristics are retained, and because both the law and firms are subject to a form of memetic 
rather than genetic evolution.
451
 Thus, after the pandemic, firms are not bound by genetic 




Still, one-time shocks may have an evolutionary effect because of inertia. Changes 
made in reaction to the pandemic will not automatically revert, even if they presently do 
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not have a useful function, unless they are actively deselected because they impede sur-
vival.
453
 Moreover, sometimes firms may be locked into a prior choice because switching 
back is inhibited by prohibitive transition cost. For example, in some cases it may be diffi-
cult and expensive to rebuild a worldwide network of supply chains after having moved to 
a more local one. In other cases, the pandemic may have inflicted a lasting change on the 
complementary institutional context outside of the control of firms, such as employment 
law or technology, thus rendering reversion inefficient.
454
 
Second, there is a possibility of a persistent evolutionary effect if the pandemic 
changes evolutionary pressures in the long run. If the virus remains endemic at least as a 
low-key background disease, occasional lockdowns and smaller economic shocks from lo-
calized outbreaks may recur. In this case, one would expect more persistent changes for 
firms, and entire corporate governance systems could be forced to adjust. If the situation 
inducing the legal change continues over time, choices will create interest groups that will 
resist modifications and will oppose a return to original laws, even if it would be welfare-
enhancing overall. In addition, even if SARS-CoV-2 is eradicated, but the adjustment pe-
riod is sufficiently long, corporate and legal cultures may have changed and become suffi-
ciently entrenched that it is difficult to return to the status quo ante. While competition 
from newer firms will eventually erode inefficient adjustments to the coronavirus, this will 
be a gradual process. 
COVID-19 illustrates another important feature of corporate law, namely that its evo-
lution often happens in leaps. We like to think of evolution as an incremental process, but 
that is not necessarily always true. Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge famously devel-
oped the theory of punctuated equilibrium, which seeks to account for rapid speciation.
455
 
Often, the fossil record appears to be in stasis over a considerable amount of time, but it 
then changes rapidly and exhibits few transitional forms in the process. The reason is that 
a small, isolated subpopulation that is better adapted eventually comes to dominate.
456
 The 
new equilibrium again persists over an extended period. This is likely the case when the 
ecosystem changes rapidly, and only those organisms well-adjusted to the new world sur-
vive and procreate. In such cases, change happens so quickly that it is not directly observ-
able for paleontologists. Similar tipping points in predator-prey relationships are captured 
in the Lotka-Volterra system, which is used to describe dynamic models of interaction sys-
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Similarly, in corporate law, when the economic environment changes quickly, only 
certain types of firms will survive, and only certain corporate governance systems will 
thrive. Both economic structures and rules tend to adjust rapidly against the backdrop of 
shocks that disrupt the system at a rapid pace.
458
 Roe has interpreted changes in the Amer-
ican corporate finance system in terms of punctuated equilibrium,
459
 but the point can eas-
ily be extended to a broader set of countries. COVID-19 may have started to convert our 
economic environment from one where gradual development is possible to one with greater 
uncertainty where, for example, the resilient structures discussed in Section IV.A are more 
adaptive. Consequently, if COVID-19 is indeed an important turning point, in a few years 
some jurisdictions may have reached a new equilibrium, as corporate governance did after 
World War II in many countries. Firms (and countries) competing economically have be-
gun to operate in a very different economic ecosystem. Gradual change may thus give way 
to a new corporate governance trajectory for the long run. 
If we apply evolutionary theory to the macro level and use corporate governance sys-
tems as the units of selection (rather than firms),
460
 it may be interesting to speculate 
whether some jurisdictions are already better pre-adjusted to the coronavirus crisis. One 
could argue in particular that the description of “resilient” structures in Section IV.A above 
more closely resembles firms in control-oriented financial systems
461
 (or in “coordinated” 
capitalist systems when following the varieties of capitalism theory)
462
 than their “arm’s 
length” (or “liberal”) counterparts. This is because these firms are already more closely 
intertwined into local financial networks, and at least in jurisdictions such as Germany and 
Japan, more coordinated with the workforce. For example, employee representation on the 
board in Germany and other European countries, or at least a structured relationship with 
unions may have facilitated more conciliatory measures to protect workers while allowing 
firms to reduce cost by switching to shorter working hours.
463
 
Does this mean that we should expect an economic resurgence in these countries? 
Such a prediction may be premature because corporate governance is not everything in 
economic organization. The United States and other “liberal” capitalist systems are also 
home to some of the most innovative tech firms in the world. In part, the reason may be 
that capital markets permit them to obtain financing for new ideas relatively effectively, 
thus enabling the rapid generation of innovation to thrive.
464
 In his comparison between 
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the United States and Japanese startup industry, Milhaupt highlighted the importance of 
liquidity for financing and high labor mobility in the United States,
465
 which are both typ-
ical for “arm’s length” economies. In fact, tech giants, such as Amazon, and upstarts, such 
as Zoom, have been among the most successful since the beginning of the pandemic.
466
 
While the above prediction may hold for the preservation of traditional industries, innova-
tion-producing countries such as the United States will continue to benefit from creative 
destruction and reconstruction. Labor market and educational institutions oriented toward 
more generalized skills may be better suited for rapid rather than incremental innova-
tion.
467
 Consequently, instead of some corporate governance systems being more resilient 
to the pandemic than others overall, we may see some countries innovating with new firms, 




Finally, it is interesting to speculate what effect the resurgence of “stakeholderism” 
will have on convergence in corporate governance.
469
 Following the accounts of propo-
nents of convergence in corporate governance, stakeholder-oriented corporate governance 
should eventually be eliminated as inefficient by international competition.
470
 One would 
therefore expect the trend to dissipate over time. However, the resurgence in nationalism 
in corporate law would likely counteract it. If economies become marginally less open, the 
force of competition in product markets will become less important, thus yielding smaller 
evolutionary pressures across countries, and less international convergence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have argued that COVID-19 has resulted in corporate governance that can broadly 
be canvassed in three categories. First, firms will have to become resilient to the crisis, and 
consequently long-term oriented. Corporations that are not operating merely on an arm’s 
length capital market basis but are integrated into a network, generating by core sharehold-
ers, state ownership, or bank lending may be more likely to survive. Moreover, firms will 
have to interact in a way with their workers that will result in a healthy workforce. Second, 
we are likely to see a resurgence of nationalism in corporate governance to ensure that 
foreign ownership and interconnected supply change do not put national security at risk. 
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Third, the existing critiques of inequality and climate change risk will accelerate the trend 
toward a broadening of corporate purpose toward stakeholderism, which has already begun 
in the past years. We have interpreted these trends in an evolutionary context. If the pan-
demic has transformed our economic environment into a more uncertain one, this means 
that different features of firms and corporate governance systems will be conducive to eco-
nomic success and survival. To the extent that corporate governance still converges across 
countries, the end point of this development will be a very different one. 
 
